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ABSTRACT
Innovation driven entrepreneurial firms have an important role in
contributing to job creation, generating technological innovation, and
stimulating the United States economy. However, there is recently a notable
decline in emerging growth entrepreneurial activity in the United States.
The Coalition Model proposes ways to maximize opportunities for industry,
academia, and government to collaborate and build sustainable
relationships, to help convert the current challenges in the U.S. market into
opportunities.
Designing a new innovation strategy will lead the United States in
generating innovation, technology, and economic growth, as well as help
the federal government harness new approaches for institutional change.
Adopting the Coalition Model (the Model) will not only bridge some of the
financial inefficiencies and information gaps associated with investment in
innovation driven enterprises, but, perhaps more importantly, will serve as
a catalyst for encouraging and stimulating the development of new firms
and technologies.
The Model is built on the notion of taking a proactive approach to
innovation. The model encourages government agencies to fund research
and innovation, by identifying specific technological challenges,
determining the course of the research that can benefit their needs,
collaborating with audiences in the public sector, research institutions, and
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universities, and private corporations to act on these needs, and advancing
commercialization efforts. There are several potential benefits to adopting
such a proactive policy. First, it might encourage future engineers,
scientists, and innovators to take a risk and become entrepreneurs. Second,
it provides direct funding to research and development needs that might not
otherwise be used. Third, it can signal that there are opportunities for
private investors to invest in such ventures, and perhaps even serve as some
sort of certification. Fourth, it will create a direct pathway for small firms
to access government procurement. Fifth, it will encourage knowledge
spillovers between professionals in government, industry, and academia.
Finally, it will increase awareness and incentives for private industry and
academia to collaborate with the government.
The Model advocates for the Administration to adopt a targeted policy
initiative (strategic development tool): the Matchmaker. The Matchmaker
is a private-public equity investment fund that will invest in early-stage
firms, while also addressing the commercial strategic development needs
articulated by the public funding partners—a governmental agency. It will
establish a channel for private firms to access government procurement and
development. The initiative will function as an autonomous body, and be
designed to prevent political capture. The adoption of the strategic
Matchmaker fund will be to complement, and not to replace, the private
market efforts in financing emerging growth firms.
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INTRODUCTION
Innovation driven entrepreneurial firms1 have an important role in
contributing to job creation, generating technological innovation, and
stimulating the United States economy. However, there was recently a
notable decline in emerging growth entrepreneurial activity in the United
States.2 According to the 2015 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM)
survey, the total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) in the United States declined
from fourteen percent (14%) to twelve percent (12%).3 The survey advances
the view that fewer Americans are taking steps to start new businesses.4
There are several reasons for this phenomenon.
Finding ways to maximize opportunities for industry, academia, and
government to collaborate and build sustainable relationships will help
convert the current challenges in the U.S. market into opportunities.
Combining the resources of these sectors will lead to innovation-driven firm
formation. This Article will advance the view that markets for allocating
risk capital to early-stage ventures are inefficient and that the financing of
these firms present countless underlying challenges to their prospective
investors and innovators. There is a financing and information gap, which
is termed the “Valley of Death.”5 The Valley of Death describes the
*
Jacobson Fellow in Law and Business, New York University School of Law. I would like to thank
Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova, Lynn A. Stout, John J. Barcelo’, Edward Beck, Avi Beck, and
the late Theodore Eisenberg who will be sorely missed, for their insights. It is dedicated to my children
Elle and Michael.
1
William Aulet & Fiona Murray, A Tale of Two Entrepreneurs: Understanding Differences in the
Types of Entrepreneurship in the Economy 1, 2-5 (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259740. According to Aulet and Murray there is
a difference between innovation-driven enterprises and small medium size enterprises. (“Not all startup
companies are created equal. Although both innovation-driven enterprises (IDEs) and traditional smalland medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can provide valuable products and services and create jobs, IDEs
– startups focused on addressing global markets based on technological, process or business model
innovation – can potentially create hundreds or even thousands of high-skill jobs if they succeed.”)
William Aulet & Fiona Murray, Abstract, A Tale of Two Entrepreneurs: Understanding Differences in
the
Types
of
Entrepreneurship
in
the
Economy
(May
1,
2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2259740).
2
See DONNA KELLEY, ET AL., G LOBAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR, 2015/16 GLOBAL REPORT
112 (2015), http://www.gemconsortium.org/report/49480.
3
Id.
4
Id. at 20 (noting that “economies showing the lowest TEA rates . . . also show low established
business ownership”).
5
See GEORGE S. FORD ET AL., PHX. CTR. FOR ADVANCED LEGAL & ECON. PUB. POL’Y STUD., A
VALLEY OF DEATH IN THE INNOVATION SEQUENCE: AN ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION (Sept. 2007),
http://www.osec.doc.gov/Report-Valley%20of%20Death%20Funding%20Gap.pdf;
see
LEWIS
BRANSCOMB & PHILLIP AUERSWALD, BETWEEN INVENTION AND INNOVATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
FUNDING
FOR
EARLYSTAGE
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
(Nov.
2002),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/gcr02-841.pdf; see also PHILLIP
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financial barriers of firms at the early stage of technology development.
Such difficulties are the product of the uncertainty, high risk and
information asymmetry problems, which preclude many investors from
backing such firms. Additionally, policymakers, practitioners and
academics alike hold strong views that investors’ emphasis on stock market
liquidity, which is evidenced by the growing high frequency and
algorithmic trading activity and short-term holding periods, encourages a
focus on short-term results.6 The short-term focus of investors and corporate
boards is currently one of the key issues in the corporate governance
debate.7
The newly elected United States Administration must devise an
innovation strategy that will lead the world in generating innovation,
technology, and economic growth, as well as help the federal government
harness new approaches for institutional change. The notion that the United
States is on the verge of losing its place as a world leader in generating
AUERSWALD ET AL., UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE-SECTOR DECISION MAKING FOR EARLY-STAGE
TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
(SEPT.
2005),
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/gcr02-841a.pdf; see also Ederyn
INGENIA
(Dec.
30,
2004)
Williams,
Crossing
the
Valley
of
Death,
http://www.ingenia.org.uk/Ingenia/Articles/284 (discussing valley of death in the UK); see also Philipp
Marxgut, Innovation Policy in the US – an Interview with Charles Wessner, BRIDGES (Oct. 16, 2008),
http://ostaustria.org/bridges-magazine/volume-19-october-16-2008/item/3585-innovation-policy-inthe-us-an-interview-with-charles-wessner (“There is great complacency in Washington about the US
position in the world. There is relatively limited understanding in the policy community about the scale
and scope of foreign investments in new technologies, including new institutions, such as ASTAR in
Singapore or the large and apparently effective Chinese S&T Parks, or the highly successful
Microelectronics center, called IMEC, in Flanders. Here in the US we do not need to do exactly what
others are doing, but we do need to greatly strengthen the interaction between the government, the
universities, and the private sector by providing a wide variety of incentives for cooperation on the new
technologies that will be the basis of future industries”).
6
See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST
HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) [hereinafter SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH] (According to Stout, the rise of shareholder primacy thinking began “in the 1970s with the rise
of the so-called Chicago School of free-market economists. Prominent members of the School began to
argue that economic analysis could reveal the proper goal of corporate quite clearly, and that goal was
to make shareholders as wealthy as possible . . . the idea that corporate performance could be simply
and easily measured through the single metric of share price . . . .”).
7
For discussion on shareholder value, see COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE
CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT (2013); see also, Ira M. Millstein, Reexamining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:52 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-board-priorities-in-an-era-of-activism/?_r=0
(“[C]orporate boards around the country should re-examine their priorities and figure out to whom they
owe their fiduciary duties. . . . Some activists are using their newfound power to sway and bully
management to focus on the short term, meet the quarterly targets and disgorge cash in extra dividends
or stock buy backs in lieu of investing in long-term growth”).
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innovation, technology, and economic growth, is not a new one.8
Economists have been warning for quite some time, even prior to the current
Administration, that the United States is facing a “historic tipping point,”9
where countries around the world are “stepping on the gas”10 to promote
innovation policies, while the United States is “slacking off,”11 lagging
behind and even worse yet, scaling back on such important policies
supporting growth efforts.12
The Administration can mitigate some of these problems by intervening
in the market in order to encourage the creation (and survival) of highgrowth firms. This Article proposes a “Coalition Model,” which promotes
policies for innovation strategy in the form of public-private partnership
initiatives. Adopting the Coalition Model bridges some of the financial
inefficiencies and information gaps associated with investment in
innovation-driven enterprises, but, perhaps, more importantly, will serve as
a catalyst for encouraging and stimulating the development of new firms
and technologies.
The Model is built on the notion of taking a proactive approach to
innovation. The Model encourages government agencies to fund research
and innovation, by identifying specific technological challenges,
determining the course of the research that can benefit their needs,
collaborating with audiences in the public sector, research institutions and
universities, and private corporations to act on these needs, and advancing
commercialization efforts.
There are several potential benefits to adopting such a proactive policy.
First, it might encourage future engineers, scientists and innovators to take
a risk and become entrepreneurs. Second, it provides direct funding to
research and development needs that might otherwise not be used. Third, it
can signal that there are opportunities for private investors to invest in such
ventures, and perhaps even serve as some sort of certification. Fourth, it will
create a direct pathway for small firms to access government procurement.
Fifth, it will encourage knowledge spillovers between professionals in
8
See JOHN KAO, INNOVATION NATION: HOW AMERICA IS LOSING ITS INNOVATION EDGE, WHY IT
MATTERS, AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO GET IT BACK 3 (2007).
9
Id. (“In tomorrow’s world, even more than today’s innovation will be the engine of progress. So
unless we move to rectify this dismal situation, the United States cannot hope to remain a leader. What’s
in stake is nothing less than the future prosperity and security of our nation”).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Richard A. Mann et al., Starting From Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to Representing a Start-Up
Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 773-74 (2004) (“A new business is started every eleven seconds in the
United States. One in twelve Americans is currently engaged in trying to start a new business. Of the
more than twenty-three million businesses in the United States, more than 98% are small businesses
employing 100 employees or fewer. Most of these businesses are not long-term survivors: 24% of new
businesses fail within two years while 63% fail within six years”).
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government, industry, and academia. And finally, it will increase awareness
in private industry and academia about the benefits of collaborating with the
government.
The Model advocates for the Administration to adopt a targeted policy
initiative (strategic development tool): the Matchmaker fund
(“Matchmaker”). The Matchmaker fund is a private-public partnership
equity investment fund, in which one of the public partners is a government
agency that will invest in early-stage firms. The government agency partner
will invest in such early-stage firms that will serve the commercial strategic
development to be articulated by the agency. The fund will establish a
channel for private firms to access government procurement and
development. The fund will function as an autonomous, non-bureaucratic
body, and be designed to prevent political capture. The adoption of the
strategic Matchmaker fund will be formed to complement, and not to
replace, the private market efforts in financing emerging growth firms.
The Model allows the government to make direct equity investments in
start-up firms using government-owned venture capital funds
(Matchmaker), while also encouraging various private intermediaries to
participate in the financings of such projects. The initiatives are designed to
ensure effectiveness and prevent political distortions based on the
successful case studies of Silicon Valley and Israel.
This article calls upon the government to craft policies for institutional
innovation that will encourage experimentation and reduce bureaucracy in
order to radically improve the performance of the Federal government by
soliciting private sector and civil society collaborations. Technological
innovation is the only reliable engine that can drive change and is the
fundamental source of sustained productivity and growth, according to
Nobel Laureate Robert Solow.13 However, there are many challenges
associated with introducing technological change into an existing
organization, especially for bureaucratic organizations such as the U.S.
government. In general, it is much easier for public or private management
to develop and invest in new technologies, rather than implement the new
technology into operations and train their employees in how to use the new
tools.14 If the current Administration intends to successfully compete in
tomorrow’s market place, promote growth, as well as increase productivity
13
Robert M. Solow, Prize Lecture: Growth Theory and After, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Dec. 8, 1987),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/solow-lecture.html.
14
See Dorothy Leonard-Barton & William A. Kraus, Implementing New Technology, HARV. BUS.
REV, Nov. 1985, https://hbr.org/1985/11/implementing-new-technology.
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and expand the economic and social value,15 then they must charge their
new policymakers with designing and instituting sweeping innovation
policies that will embrace new approaches to management, technologies and
operating methods.16 This article will accordingly promote the following
policy recommendations.
There is a public debate in the U.S. concerning the role of the
government in relation to the market. The U.S. has a long history of conflict
with regards to the national policy and political structure concerning the
government’s development efforts.17 The conflict can be traced to the times
of the beginning of the Republic,18 to the difference in philosophy between
founding fathers Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. According to
legal scholar Hockett,19 Jefferson20 suggested that governments work best
when they govern the least (favoring the non-interventionist government),
15
See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism
– and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. – Feb. 2011, at. 1, 5.
16
Fred Block, Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the
United States, 36 POL. & SOC’Y 169 (2008); see also KENT HUGHES, BUILDING THE NEXT AMERICAN
CENTURY: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS (Woodrow Wilson Center Press
2005); see also Mary J. Dent, A Rose by Any Other Name: How Labels Get in the Way of U.S. Innovation
Policy, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 128, 130-31 (2011) (“We lack a deep, broad national understating of why
promoting innovation should be a national priority. As a result, we fail to address innovation policies in
a proactive, explicit, and effective way.” Dent further discussed the “Volcker Rule” of the Dodd-Frank
Act and stated that “polices [sic] that affect the innovation sector are frequently adopted as part of
broader packages that have nothing to do with innovation”); see Porter & Kramer, supra note 15 (“The
concept of shared value . . . recognizes that societal needs, not just conventional economic needs, define
markets. It also recognizes that social harms or weaknesses frequently create internal costs for firms—
such as wasted energy or raw materials, costly accidents, and the need for remedial training to
compensate for inadequacies in education. And addressing societal harms and constraints does not
necessarily raise costs for firms, because they can innovate through using new technologies, operating
methods, and management approaches—and as a result, increase their productivity and expand their
markets. Shared value, then, is not about personal values. Nor is it about “sharing” the value already
created by firms—a redistribution approach. Instead, it is about expanding the total pool of economic
and social value”).
17
Robert C. Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints &
Finance in an Authentic American “Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45 (2005-2006)
[hereinafter Jeffersonian Republic].
18
See id.; see also Alexander Hamilton’s Final Version of the Report on the Subject of
Manufactures, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-00010007 (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (presenting validations for the encouragement of domestic
manufacturing and made explicit plans for government action).
19
See Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 17 (According to Hockett, there are fundamental
differences in economic philosophies of the founding fathers, as follows: Jefferson suggested that
governments work best when they govern the least, while Hamilton advocated for a strong centralized
government with powers to work for the common benefit of all).
20
See id. (According to Hockett, Thomas Jefferson was a member of the Southern planter
aristocracy and, as a result, was somewhat prejudiced towards the “yeoman republic.” Jefferson was
suspicious of a central government and objected to the idea of heavy industry and over-crowded large
cities, while aspiring to a civic republic comprised of small landowners, who contracted using commoninterest agreements via mutual discourse).
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while Hamilton21 advocated for a strong centralized government with
powers to work for the common benefit of all (favoring the interventionist
government).
Other scholars, such as Block, claim that this tension was resolved
fairly22 in the twentieth century when developmental policies were formed
within the context of national defense.23 For the purposes of this article, the
result of such integration is embedded in the grants and funds that were
invested by the U.S. government in countless advanced technologies, such
as jet planes, computers, lasers, civilian nuclear energy, and
biotechnology.24 This article advances the view that for national defense
purposes, the U.S. Government must intervene in the market in order to
encourage entrepreneurship and innovation policy.
There are several roles that government can take in order to intervene in
the market. First, there is a “supervisory”25 view of the government, which
differentiates between the government and the market, and separates
between the public and private spheres.26 Government interventions,
accordingly, are considered exogenous because the government is changing
the ordinary way of things.27
Second, there is a “constitutive” or “foundational” view, by which
governments are “internal” to and even create the markets by developing
the “rules of the game.”28 According to this view, the law is “foundational”
to operating markets, and the market performance is actually enhanced
21
See id. (According to Hockett, Hamilton envisioned a meritocratic republic, such as the one in
which Hamilton himself had flourished and thrived in. The foundation for a national supremacy should
be a strong, industrialized economy, where the nation can produce its own goods).
22
It should be noted that politically, the debate is still ongoing in the U.S. with Republicans saying
they want to do away with big government and Democrats wishing for big government. See Jeffersonian
Republic, supra note 17.
23
See Block, supra note 16, at 6; see Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 17 (Hockett further argues
that the U.S. has advanced to integrate the ideals of both founders).
24
See Block, supra note 16, at 6-7 (According to Block, following World War II, the Pentagon
worked intimately and cooperated with other national security agencies such as the atomic Energy
Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), and such cooperation and
funding had a key role in developing these technologies).
25
See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments
as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53, 56-57 (2014) (“In this capacity, governments act
much as private actors do in particular markets. They employ the same means toward their ends”) (the
term was introduced by Hockett & Omarova).
26
See id. at 54 (“Government is in this sense taken for “external” to markets, while “we,” the public
—for unexplained reasons categorically distinguished from “our” government — are counted as
“internal” to the practices of market exchange. Call this “supervisory,” or “deus ex machina” view of
government in its relation to markets”).
27
Id. (“Governments ‘step in’ from ‘outside’”).
28
Id. at 55 (These rules “even define markets from the . . . ‘ground up’”).
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when regulated by the law.29
The third view, and the one that this article will advance, is one
sustaining the government’s role as a “marker actor.”30 According to legal
scholars Hockett and Omarova, this view is often overlooked.31 When the
government acts as a market participant, it does so “for public rather than
private ends,” and in doing so, it defies the “venerable but misleading”
separation between the private and public spheres.32 Our society perhaps
allows the government to act as a market participant because the
government is able to have more effect (influence) on the market than
private parties.33 This article will illuminate the “market-acting role” of the
US government. The notion of the United States government acting as a
catalyst or even a venture capitalist is not a novel one. Throughout United
States history, the governments have played the role of venture capitalists
at the State and local level and even at the federal level, suggesting that
public intervention in the market is acceptable and perhaps even
necessary. 34
The Coalition Model derives from the core concept of Solow that
technological innovation is the only reliable engine that drives change and
is a fundamental source for productivity and sustained economic growth.35
The Coalition Model builds on Solow’s model and adds that government
intervention is required because it is a powerful market actor36 and can
29

Id.
Id. at 55-56 (“In this capacity, governments act much as private actors do in particular markets.
They employ the same means toward their ends. They do so, however, for public rather than private
ends, thereby defying, in limited ways, such venerable but misleading dichotomies as the ‘public/private’
divide”).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 56 (“They do so, moreover, with greater influence than private parties are typically able—
or permitted—to bring to bear. And we permit our government this form of market power, in turn,
precisely because it is public rather than private power—power wielded on behalf of and in the name of
us all”). There are four recurring types of government participation (intervention) in private markets (for
public ends), according to Hockett and Omarova. They are: “market-making” (means “government’s
playing a particular risk-bearing role that private actors themselves sometimes but not always are able
to play either (a) makes a publicly beneficial market possible, or (b) facilitates an incipient such market’s
growth to critical mass”), “market-moving” (means “government action affects certain market prices in
certain publicly beneficial ways that we cannot ordinarily trust profit-driven private actors to pursue”),
“market-levering” (means “government action enables existing private markets to do better, or to do
more of, what they already do in more limited or otherwise suboptimal manners”), and “marketpreserving” (means “government action- typically temporary and only in extremis – prevents complete
liquidation or collapse of a normally well-functioning market whose collapse would impose negative
externalities”). Id. at 56-57.
34
See JOSH LERNER, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO BOOST
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED –AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT viii
(Princeton University Press 2009) [hereinafter BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS].
35
See Solow, Prize Lecture, supra note 13.
36
See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25.
30
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alleviate the discussed current market inefficiencies. A detailed analysis of
the Matchmaker initiative and the market inefficiency that it tries to mitigate
is provided below. Society becomes a stakeholder in economic growth
because it empowers the government to act on its behalf. As noted above,
government intervention is not a new concept because the government takes
risk-bearing roles that private actors are not always able (or willing) to take
for one reason or another.37
It also builds on the notion that the government needs to invest in
knowledge, human capital, and innovation in order to encourage knowledge
spillovers38 by encouraging the formation (and survival) of new
entrepreneurial firms and stimulating growth.39
Therefore, the United States government needs to intervene in the market
in order to increase growth, entrepreneurship, and innovation.40 The
Coalition Model is designed as a policy tool for government intervention
that takes the form of the proposed public-private partnerships that allow
for strategic planning to benefit society for future generations.
In order to develop the coalition, the conventional community of
stakeholders is expanded to include the private sector (entrepreneurial and
established firms), management, academia and research community,
industry and economic development organizations, federal, state, regional
and local governments, the financial sector including investment banks,
angel groups and venture capital groups, on top of the traditional
stakeholder groups, which include: customers, employees, creditors,
suppliers, and shareholders.
The Coalition Model is designed as a public-private-partnership, which
describes a relationship wherein private and public resources are combined
to achieve goals that will benefit both parties. Public-private-partnerships
have been used to contribute to public benefit in national economies since
the beginning of recorded history.41 In the United States, technology clusters
37

See id.
See Audretsch, infra note 315, at 9-10 (discussing “knowledge spillover” and how “small firms
account for a disproportional share of new product innovations given their low R&D expenditures”).
39
BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34.
40
See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25.
41
Louis Witters et al., The Role of Public-Private Partnerships in Driving Innovation, in THE
GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX OF 2012, at 81 (Soumitra Dutta ed., WIPO 2012),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/economics/gii/gii_2012.pdf (discussing the following examples
of public-private-partnerships (PPPs):
“[I]n the city-state of Athens in the 4th century BC, prominent citizens made major
contributions in order to stage public festivals and religious events and to build public buildings
and monuments. Some centuries later, when the Roman army conquered large parts of Europe
and the Mediterranean region, civilians worked hand-in-hand with the army to exploit the new
38
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in Silicon Valley and Route 128 emerged thanks to government intervention
in the market (in the form of public-private-partnerships) as noted above.
Moreover, much of the technological advancement, which revolutionized
the market and our lives, such as the Internet,42 was made possible thanks
to public-private-partnerships.
Public-private-partnerships are defined as “contractual agreements
between a public agency or public-sector authority and a private-sector
entity that allow for greater private participation in the delivery of public
services, or in developing an environment that improves the quality of life
for the general public.”43
The Coalition Model is a form of public-private-partnership that uses
various methods of collaboration, which combine the government’s
forward-thinking policies and the private sector’s innovative efforts, as well
as the support from nonprofit organizations and private intermediaries. This
article, therefore, promotes the view of the role of government as a market
participant and calls for an intervention in the market for national security
and economic reasons.
The subsequent parts of this article examine the U.S. Government
intervention in the market throughout history. Part II introduces the
historical economic and legal evolution of the model, starting with the
Declaration of Independence in Section (1), the period between 1865 and
1920 in Section (2), and a discussion of the rise of the large, vertically
integrated American corporation in Section (3). Section (3) also includes
two important examples: (a) the story of the Advanced Projects Research
Agency (ARPA), and (b) the successful outcome of the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) program. Section (c) then describes the
changes in the United States market from patterns of vertical corporate
development (such as the example of corporations in Route 128) towards a
territories and build needed infrastructure. PPPs have a long history in the United States of
America (USA) as well: the principle that government and political leaders should use and
support private businesses—in order to develop scientific advancement and innovations for the
benefit of the society—was well established at the time the country’s constitution was written.
One of the first instances of a PPP in the New World occurred in 1742 when Benjamin Franklin
established the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia, which— together with the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives—sponsored the founding of the University of
Pennsylvania, the first medical school in the British colonies. The purpose of this collaboration
was to make advancements in agriculture, science, and medicine available to all citizens.
Another, more recent, renowned project that brought the business world and government
together in the public interest was the building of the Paris metro: the tunnels were constructed
by the city, while the tracks, energy, signaling, and rolling stock were provided by the operator,
a Belgian entrepreneur”).
42
See Block, supra note 16, at 9.
43
Witters et al., supra note 41, at 81 (“Under such a legal construction, the partners share risk,
reward, and responsibility for a shared investment. These partnerships are not simply tools for funding
projects, but they require full commitment from all partners for the entire undertaking”).
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network of organizations (such as Silicon Valley). Section (4) provides an
overview of the Startup America initiative and additional federal
initiatives led by the Obama Administration that were intended to promote
innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth. Section (5) provides
constructive criticism to previous government intervention in the market.
In Part III, the Matchmaker initiative component of the Coalition
Model is emphasized. The Coalition Model is derived from Solow’s
model.44 Solow introduced the notion that innovation stimulates growth.45
This part explains the model and the choice of the public-private-partnership
form, as well as introduces a proposal for a government Matchmaker
venture capital fund initiative. The Matchmaker initiative is a targeted
policy effort aimed at designing a platform for a competitive venture capital
industry in the United States that promotes government venture capital
investments in early-stage technology firms (start-ups) for national security
purposes. Section (1) provides an overview of the role of the Venture
Capital industry in the U.S. innovation process. Section (2) introduces the
Matchmaker initiative, with an emphasis on the governance mechanisms.
Part (a) introduces the fund’s “General Partner.” Sub-section (i) introduces
the compensation structure, while giving examples of In-Q-Tel (the CIA VC
fund). Sub-section (ii) introduces the incentives & safeguards. Sub-section
(iii) discusses the required bidding process. Sub-section (iv) introduces the
matching component and additional incentives to the “Upside.” Part (b)
introduces the Limited Partners, especially the applicable U.S. government
agency, in Sub-section (i). sub-section (ii) explains the mission and
supervision. Sub-section (iii) introduces the user-friendly application
process. Part (c) introduces the Private Investors.
Part IV is an international comparison with Startup Nation’s (Israel)
successful Yozma funds initiative. Section (1) introduces the “Yozma”
funds initiative. Section (2) reviews the reasons for Israeli government
intervention in the market. Section (3) provides a summary of Inbal, an
Israeli government intervention that failed but led to the design of Yozma.
Section (4) provides an overview of the successful Yozma design. Section
(5) compares Yozma with similar Silicon Valley initiatives.
Part V addresses the criticism of whether the Matchmaker is designed to
prevent potential abuse. Section (1) introduces the problem of inadequate
monitoring of public management. Section (2) provides an overview for the
44
Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65 (1956);
see also Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON.
& STAT., Aug. 1957, at 312; see also Solow, Prize Lecture, supra note 13.
45
Solow, Prize Lecture, supra note 13.
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lack of market discipline of government-owned firms. Section (3) discusses
illegal behavior and corruption of public managers. Section (4) discusses
the issues of the political capture of business objectives.
Part VI offers a summary of concluding thoughts about the Coalition
Model and its applications.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS A MARKET
PARTICIPANT
A nation’s innovative system has a tendency to mirror its deliberate
determination to maintain and expand its economic strength.46 This part
provides a historic-doctrinal review of the processes that shaped the U.S.
national innovation system, focusing on the role of the U.S. government as
a “market actor.”47

A. The Declaration of Independence
In the course of gaining its independence, the United States government
was able to establish institutional support, by which ingenuity could
thrive.48 There were several factors that contributed to changes in the
innovation market during the period of independence. This Article will only
address the following two. First and foremost, the United States
Constitution, which instituted far-reaching changes and guaranteed an
internal joint market, allows residential United States entrepreneurial
ventures to expand and supply the national market.49
46
Scholars found that the national security concerns of the nations had been central in shaping their
innovation systems; see RICHARD NELSON, NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 508 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993); see also PETER DRUCKER, INNOVATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 257 (Harper & Row 1985) (“There must be an economy full of innovators and
entrepreneurs, with entrepreneurial vision and entrepreneurial values, with access to venture capital, and
filled with entrepreneurial vigor”).
47
See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25 at 55-56. It should also be noted that President Obama’s
administration took an interest in government-facilitated multi-stakeholder processes with regards to the
Internet. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE
INTERNET
ECONOMY:
A
DYNAMIC
FRAMEWORK,
at
iii
(2010),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/iptf_privacy_greenpaper_12162010.pdf (“The United
States has developed a model that facilitates transparency, promotes cooperation, and strengthens multistakeholder governance that has allowed innovation to flourish while building trust and protecting a
broad array of other rights and interests”); see also Symposium, The 11th Annual Digital Broadband
Migration Symposium: The Dynamics of Disruptive Innovation, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1
(2012).
48
Louis P. Cain, Entrepreneurship in the Antebellum United States, in THE INVENTION OF
ENTERPRISE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FROM ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA TO MODERN TIMES 331 (David S.
Landes, et al., eds, 2010) (“There was general agreement among the new country’s leaders that the
national government was not functioning efficiently under the Articles of Confederation, so a
constitutional federal system was introduced relatively quickly”).
49
Id. (“The representatives of the individual states conscientiously guarded their powers and, in
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Another important evolution and invention during that period that
stimulated innovators to take a risk and start a new innovation-driven
business was patent law, which gave innovators strong property rights,
while also allowing knowledge spillovers and sharing of information.
Historian Steven Lubar stated that the “[n]ineteenth-century patent law
embodied a delicate balance of monopoly, to encourage invention; the
dissemination of new ideas, to encourage the increase of knowledge; and
ease of use of patents, to encourage innovation.”50
B. The period between 1865 and 1920
During the period between 1865 and 1920, the State governments (rather
than the federal government) had an active role in subsidizing
transportation, making western lands accessible to those who wanted to
develop them, mapping the location of raw material properties and
financing education (and institutions) in order to supply technological
knowledge, according to economic historian Lamoreaux.51 During that
period, holders of intellectual property enjoyed strong protection, provided
by the US patent laws. In addition to the modest cost protection, the creation
of a strong patent law system helped to spread the vast information of novel
technologies.52
An additional important development during that period was the
establishment of the National Banking System. By creating the National
Banking System, the federal government succeeded in instituting a
standardized national currency that decreased transactions costs in
interregional trade.53 Despite the fact that at that period the National
Article I, Section 8, relinquished to the federal government only those rights they believed were
essential. Article I, Section 10, restricts individual state’s dealing with foreign powers and prohibits the
creation of state paper money. It included the famed contract clause that establishes the sanctity of
contract, the deliberate protection of property rights, and the equally famed commerce clause that
prohibits restrictions on interstate commerce”).
50
Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE, 932, 934
(1991); see also Cain, supra note 48, at 331.
51
Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Entrepreneurship in the United States, 1865-1920, in THE INVENTION OF
ENTERPRISE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FROM ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA TO MODERN TIMES 391-92 (David
Landes et al. eds., 2010) (According to Lamoreaux, state and local governments, from approximately
1865-1920, played a more dynamic part in the economy, but even at those levels, governments mainly
got involved in ways that improved the security and transparency of economic transactions. That policy
changed only with the rise of big business, when governments started taking a considerable regulatory
function – first at the state level and then at the federal level).
52
Id.
53
Id.

Washington University Open Scholarship

282

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:267

Banking System had some wretched consequences that enhanced economic
uncertainty,54 the end result of creating a national standardized currency was
overall beneficial.

C. The Rise of Large, Vertically Integrated American
Corporations
The market economy in the twentieth century in the United States has
classically been characterized as the “harnessing of technology by
entrepreneurs working for large vertically integrated American
corporations”, according to historian Margaret Graham, “at first as a wholly
private sector phenomenon, and then in cooperation with an increasingly
interventionist federal government.”55
Graham divided that period into three different parts with respect to
entrepreneurship.56 The first, characterized as the fiscally frenzied interwar
period, covers the years of 1920 to 1941.57 According to Graham, the U.S.
government tried to push for productivity and supplied many opportunities
in the fast-growing industries.58 However, this development was followed
by a rapid downfall of the numerous new companies prior to and throughout
the Great Depression. The era ended with the U.S. entering into World War
II.59
The second period covers the years between 1941 until 1974, from
World War II until the commencement of a lengthy phase of inflation, which
began with the Vietnam War.60 According to Graham, during that period,
large corporations did not regard innovation as a high priority. Moreover,
innovation was unsolicited and unwelcomed in various sectors of the U.S.
industry, excluding areas selected for “high-tech” businesses, which were
desirable to the U.S. military advancements and were at times crossovers
that could commercialize technology that was initially developed for
military purposes for civil products.61
The third period, between 1975 and 2000, is sometimes referred to as the
54

Id.
Margaret B.W. Graham, Entrepreneurship in the United States, 1920-2000, in THE INVENTION
OF ENTERPRISE: ENTREPRENEURSHIP FROM ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA TO MODERN TIMES (David Landes
et al. eds., 2010).
56
Id. at 404.
57
See id. (according to Graham, this era is characterized by a search for economic self-regulation).
58
See id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See id. (according to Graham, there was constant national mobilization during that era; however,
there was fairly stagnant economic equilibrium, highlighting optimization).
55
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third industrial revolution.62 This period is distinguished from the previous
two due to the combination of the information revolution and globalization
trends.63 It began with a period of stagflation and was perpetuated by the
U.S. financial institutions’ insurgency.64 It concluded in a sequence of
financial bubbles and the collapse of the telecommunications industry and
the dot-com craze.65 The following are some examples of successful
government intervention in the market during these periods.
1. Advanced Projects Research Agency (ARPA)
The Advanced Projects Research Agency (ARPA) example is an
illustration of a successful intervention of a U.S. government policy during
the 1960s, which was responsible for the invention of the Internet.66 The
Pentagon created the ARPA in order to provide funding for technologies
following the “Soviet success with Sputnik”.67
The initiatives of ARPA computer offices cultivated a diverse and
distinct government model that funded research. It took a proactive
approach to innovation, in stark contrast to other federal agencies, which
were generally reactive. It was highly active in determining the course of
the research. 68 Its goal was to generate a scientific community in order to
focus on specific technological challenges, with audiences in the public
sector, universities and private corporations.69 ARPA operated small offices
staffed with top engineers and scientists, who were given extensive budget
autonomy to sponsor promising ideas.70
62

See id.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
See id.; See also Block, supra note 16 (according to Block, in 1962, ARPA’s Information
Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) was originally established, and played a central role in the
development of computer science. IPTO granted funds to establish computer science departments at
major universities and financed a series of research project that successfully pushed forward
developments in human-computer interface).
67
See Block, supra note 16, at 7.
68
See id. (According to Block, “ARPA did not leave most of the initiative in the hands of the
research community, therefore, it’s policy was different from other federal agencies, such as the National
Science Foundation, which relied on peer review of research proposals”).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 7. (“ARPA made a practice of hiring visionary technologists and giving them a very high
degree of autonomy to give out research funds. The organizational structure was extremely lean with
very small staffs and a minimum of paperwork. ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques Office
(IPTO) was initially established in 1962 and played a central role in the advance of computer technology
in the 1960s and 1970s. IPTO provided the resources to create computer science departments at major
universities and funded a series of research project that successfully pushed forward advances in the
human-computer interface. In fact, many of the technologies that were ultimately incorporated into the
63
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ARPA did not draw a line between “basic research” and “applied
research.”71 Funding was granted to various groups such as start-up firms,
university-based researchers, and industry syndicates.72 In order to prevent
abuse or waste, ARPA staff transferred resources from unproductive groups
to more promising, productive and profitable ones.73
APRA provided firms with venture capital-like services including
mentoring, strategic planning, technological and business brokering
services.74 It assisted firms in reaching the phase of commercial capability.75
It made cooperative connections among resources, ideas and people from
diverse development and research sites, which is an essential component to
the proposed “Coalition” model.76
The government played the crucial role of a “market-maker,”77 as it took
the risk-bearing role (that private actors during that period were not able to
play) and essentially made the high technology world and Internet that we
know and use today possible.
2. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is another
example of a successful government intervention in the market via the
creation of legislation aimed at stimulating an existing market or even
starting a new market.78 It is also a leading example of a United States
personal computer were developed by ARPA-funded researchers”).
71
Id. at 8.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 7-8 (according to Block, ARPA employed visionary and creative technologists and gave
them the autonomy to grant research funds).
74
Id. at 8.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25 (according to Hockett & Omarova, “market-making”
means “government’s playing a particular risk-bearing role that private actors themselves sometimes but
not always are able to play either (a) makes a publicly beneficial market possible, or (b) facilitates an
incipient such market’s growth to critical mass”).
78
There is a long list of important federal legislation concerning innovation: Bayh-Dole Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-201 (2000 & Supp. II 2002));
Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1980); Small Business
Innovation Development Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006); National Cooperative Research Act, Pub.
L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05); NSF Establishes Program for
Engineering Research Centers (1985); Small Business Technology Transfer Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-564, 106 Stat. 4249 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2006)); Department of Commerce
Advanced Technology Program (ATP) (1988); Manufacturing Extension Program (1988); Defense
Industrial and Technology Base Initiative (1991); High Performance Computing Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-194, § 102, 105 Stat. 1495, 1598-99 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5512) (1991); Small Business
Research and Development Enhancement Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C. § 638 (1992). For further details on
this legislation see Block, supra note 16, at 11-12.
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public-private partnership that stimulates innovative new technologies.79
The SBIR program was founded in 1982, and was intended80 to
encourage “small businesses”81 to develop new products and processes as
well as present valuable research for the nation’s research and development
efforts.82 The program mandates the eleven federal agencies (with
extramural research budgets in excess of $100 million) to allocate a certain
percentage83 of their total extramural research and development budgets for
grants or contracts to small businesses84 conducting research and
development that have commercialization potential and meet the needs of
the United States Government.85
The SBIR program continues to play an important strategic role in the
United States’ innovation efforts. In the words of its founder Roland
Tibbetts, “[t]he US leads the world in three areas important to economic
79
See CHARLES WESSNER, SBIR AND THE PHASE III CHALLENGE OF
COMMERCIALIZATION: REPORT OF A SYMPOSIUM 9 (National Academics Press 2007).
According to Wessner:
“Commercializing SBIR-funded technologies though federal procurement is no less
challenging for innovative small companies. Finding private sources of funding to further
develop even successful SBIR Phase II projects—those innovations that have demonstrated
technical and commercial feasibility—is often difficult because the eventual ‘market’ for
products is unlikely to be large enough to attract private venture funding. As Mark Redding of
Impact Technologies noted at the conference, venture capitalists tend to avoid funding firms
focused on government contracts citing higher costs, regulatory burdens, and limited markets
associated with government contracting.”
80
About SBIR, SBIR/STTR, http://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir (last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (The
following are the program’s objectives: “Stimulate technological innovation; Meet Federal research and
development needs; Foster and encourage participation in innovation and entrepreneurship by socially
and economically disadvantaged persons; [and] Increase private-sector commercialization of
innovations derived from federal research and development funding”).
81
“Small businesses” for the purpose of the Act are businesses with less than 500 people.
82
See WESSNER, supra note 79, at xiii (“SBIR grants and contracts are intended to stimulate
innovative new technologies to help agencies meet the specific research and development needs of the
nation”).
83
For example, 2.8% of such budget in 2014.
84
It should be noted that the SBIR does not fund “Phase III” innovation, which is a stage of
development when the company and technology is expected to obtain private funding or government
contracts. Instead, funding is targeted to the pre-commercial stage of technology development. See
Matthew R. Keller & Fred Block, Explaining the Transformation in the US Innovation System: The
Impact of a Small Government Program, 11 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 629, 640 (2013) (“Initially, the program
provided up to $50,000 (now $150,000 under the 2011 authorization) in ‘Phase I’ support – generally
up to 6 months – to ‘explore [] the technical merit or feasibility of an idea or technology.’ Phase I
awardees could subsequently apply for up to $500,000 (now $1,000,000) of ‘Phase II’ funding –
generally up to 2 years of work – during which ‘R&D work is performed and the developer evaluates
commercialization potential’”).
85
This program facilitates the award of approximately $2.5 billion every year. See Keller & Block,
supra note 84, at 640 (The federal agencies “were given considerable leeway to determine how they met
their obligations under the Act; they could provide funds as grants or contracts and they could solicit
proposals with narrow or broad specifications of relevant research”).

Washington University Open Scholarship

286

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:267

growth - basic research, small high tech firms and venture capital. SBIR
pulls them together.”86 There are many examples of successful companies
that received early-stage financing from SBIC, such as Symantec, DaVinci,
Qualcomm and iRobot.
Participation in the SBIR program affords many benefits (in addition to
funding) including advanced networking and protection of intellectual
property. Participants in the program “get preferential access to federal
procurement opportunities.”87 There are protections for participating
companies in the program (who do not yet have patent rights), which protect
their innovative ideas from theft by competitors or peer reviewers.88 It
should be noted that the government (for a fee) has the right to license the
technology of the small company that participates in the SBIR program.
However, the technology itself remains the property of the company.89
There are several events and legislations that contributed to the
establishment of the SBIR program. In 1958, the Small Business Investment
Companies (SBICs) Act90 was enacted in order to offer matching federal
funds for private investment (it was used by individual angels in order to
fund innovation).91 In 1977, the United States National Science Foundation
(NSF) responded to various processes in the market and shifted its policy,
from focusing on research and sciences to establishing a pilot, the SBIR
program, which was designed to encourage small firms to develop their
ideas and innovations into products and processes.92
The NSF’s SBIR initiative was a response to the following factors and
events. First, in the late 1970s, the American economy suffered through two
oil supply shocks, recessions, rising prices, and stagnant productivity, in
addition to facing rising international competition from Japan and
Germany.93 These economic crises and challenges invoked a nationwide
reaction and established novel public policies, which centered on long86

See About SBIR, supra note 80.
See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 640 (“[A]gencies that engage in substantial procurement,
such as the Department of Defense (DOD), would expect to purchase successful technologies, or link
them to projects pursued by prime contractors. SBIR legislation fostered such relationships by providing
awardees with preferential access to federal procurement opportunities”).
88
See id. (“These protections helped to assure small firms that peer reviewers and potential
competitors such as prime defense contractors would be less inclined to ‘borrow’ ideas from firms that
have not yet obtained patents”); see also WESSNER, supra note 79.
89
See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 640-41.
90
Small Business Investment Companies Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 384 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 681-687h (1958)).
91
SBIC was used by individual angels in order to fund innovation. See Darian M. Ibrahim,
Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 717, 741 (2010).
92
See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 639 (According to Keller and Block, “NSF had traditionally
focused on academic science and engineering research, and the pilot program represented a significant
shift”).
93
See HUGHES, supra note 16, at 2.
87
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standing productivity growth.94
Second, there was an increase in appreciation of the fact that small firms
drive innovation.95 Third, there were constant deliberations within the
Executive Branch on how to encourage innovation and stimulate the United
States market96 due to concerns about a diminishing competitiveness of the
United States (during the period of stagflation).97
The pilot program was very successful, and during the 1980s the United
States Congress passed several laws that allowed the NSF to institute the
SBIR program. The first legislation was the Bayh-Dole Act (1980),98 which
allowed scientists, for the first time, to keep the intellectual property rights
of innovation that was developed from federal funds. Scientists who
received funds from the federal government to conduct research could form
new startup firms that could profit from discoveries that arose from the
federally funded research and even own the intellectual property. In that
way, the Bayh-Dole Act encouraged startup formation.99
The second legislation was the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act (1980),100 which was the first technology transfer law. It was
enacted in order to improve and develop cooperative research between
publicly funded entities and corporations by requiring federal laboratories
94

Id.
See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 629.
96
Id. at 639 (“As early as the Nixon Administration, there was recognition of the urgency of
capitalizing on US technological leadership to strengthen competitiveness. Hurt (2011) shows that many
ideas about the use of public-private partnerships to facilitate technology development emerged in a
comprehensive review carried out by the Nixon Administration, but they were not implemented when
the Administration was overcome by Watergate”).
97
Id. at 639-40 (“[T]hese ideas re-emerged during the Carter Administration in the Domestic Policy
Review on Industrial Innovation that was itself a response to concerns about declining US
competitiveness. Headed by Jordan Baruch, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, the review began in 1978
and culminated in a series of Industrial Innovation Initiatives Proposed by Carter in October, 1979. Two
immediate results of the effort were the passage by Congress in 1980 of the Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Innovation Act and the Bayh-Dole Act. Stevenson-Wydler authorized Commerce and NFS
to create Centers for Industrial Technology and to promote cooperative research between corporations
and publicly funded entities”); see also James Turner, The Next Innovation Revolution: Laying the
Groundwork for the United States, INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, & GLOBALIZATION, June 2006,
at 123.
98
Bayh-Dole Act, supra note 78.
99
While the SBIR provided a flow of government dollars to support startups, the legislation of the
Bayh-Dole Act actually encouraged startup formation. The Bayh-Dole Act authorized university-based
scientists to form new startup firms that could exploit the discoveries that transpired from the federally
funded research, while their startup company would own the intellectual property. See Keller & Block,
supra note 84, at 641 (“Parallel efforts were designed to shift the focus of scientists and engineers at
government laboratories toward technologies with commercial potential. If these efforts were
successful, SBIR would be a source of funding.”).
100
Federal Technology Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 3710c (1989)).
95
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to actively engage in technology transfer.101 It allowed federal laboratories
to transfer technology to nonfederal entities easily. It also authorized the
NSF to create Centers for Industrial Technology.102
The third legislation was the Small Business Innovation Development
Act (1982),103 which recommended and then formed the SBIR (then NSF
pilot) program. It also called for larger federal backing for small innovative
firms.104
The fourth legislation was the Small Business Technology Transfer
(STTR) Act,105 which was created in order to enhance collaboration
between small firms and a university or federal laboratory.
In the past, the tone from other (than NSF) federal agencies towards the
SBIR was hostile. According to Matthew Keller and Fred Block,
“[a]dministrators saw it as a tax on research funds; it reduced their discretion
and added considerable costs of screening applications and contracting with
multiple small firms since the legislation provided no funds to cover
administration.”106
Nevertheless, federal agencies changed their attitude towards SBIR
(especially ones that were directly involved with the programs). Thanks to
the successful SBIR program, officials quickly learned that “small firms
were often able to deliver new capabilities, more quickly than large,
established contractors which tended to be slower and more
bureaucratic.”107
To sum up, according to economists Keller and Block,108 this small
government program (SBIR) played a central role109 in revolutionizing the
role of innovation in the United States economy via four distinctive
mechanisms: encouraging engineers and scientists to become entrepreneurs;
direct funding; signaling opportunities for private investors (and
101
The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act compels federal laboratories to set apart a
certain percentage of the laboratory budget exclusively for technology transfer activities. StevensonWydler Act, supra note 78.
102
See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 640 (“This recommendation was implemented in 1982,
under Roanld Reagan, when the Small Innovation Development Act was signed into law. The legislation
had bipartisan support, but Senator Kennedy played a central role in marshalling it through the Senate”);
see also Arthur Obermayer, Senator Ted Kennedy’s Role in the Birth of the Small Business Innovation
Research Program, (Aug. 28, 2009), http://www.zynsys.com/sbir/Kennedy_&_SBIR.pdf.
103
Small Business Innovation Development Act, supra note 78.
104
Id.
105
Small Business Technology Transfer Act, supra note 78. The STTR provides aid to
collaborations between a university or federal lab and a small firm.
106
See Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 641.
107
See id.
108
See id. (They suggest the term “social resonance” in order to show “how even small government
programs can play an important role in altering large scale institutional dynamics”).
109
See id. (Keller & Block propose the term “social resonance” to capture the catalytic role that the
SBIR, a government program, played given the right circumstances).
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certification); and creating pathways to government procurement.110
SBIR was a federal government initiative that changed the United States
innovation system during the 1980s. Federal, state and local government
initiatives influenced innovation and development efforts in states such as
Massachusetts and California.

D. Startup America & Additional Federal Initiatives led by the
Obama Administration to Promote Innovation,
Entrepreneurship and Growth
In recent years, efforts were made by the Obama administration to boost
innovation by encouraging technology incubation and venture capital.
President Obama111 launched the “Startup America” program, a national
drive to present mentorship and funding in order to grow new businesses.112
Startup America is an umbrella initiative that included the following
efforts. First, it centered on increasing entrepreneurial education and
mentorship.113 Second, it included proposals to boost entrepreneurs’ access
to capital.114 Third, it attempted to limit regulatory barriers to starting and
growing companies.115 Fourth, it prompted technology commercialization
efforts by universities.116 Finally, it aimed at generating new entrepreneurial
opportunities in crucial industries such as education, healthcare and
energy.117
On September 27, 2010, Congress and President Obama118 signed into
110

See id.
See Russell Nichols, State Governments: The Latest Venture Capitalists, GOVERNING MAGAZINE
(Mar. 2011), http://www.governing.com/State-Governments-Latest-Venture-Capitalists.html (As part
of his State of the Union pledge to “win the future” by boosting innovation, President Obama stated:
“Part of the mission of the program is to eliminate the capital gains tax on some small business
investments and speed up the patent process. The U.S. Small Business Administration was directed $2
billion to match private-sector investment capital for under-the-radar startups and firms with highgrowth potential”).
112
Id.
113
See Aaron Chatterji et al., Clusters of Entrepreneurship and Innovation (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 19013, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19013.pdf.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Small Business Jobs Act – Learn What’s in It, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/09/27/president-obama-signs-smallbusiness-jobs-act-learn-whats-it (According to President Obama, the act is “important because small
businesses produce most of the new jobs in this country. They are the anchors of our Main Streets. They
are part of the promise of America – the idea that if you’ve got a dream and you’re willing to work hard,
you can succeed. That’s what leads a worker to leave a job to become her own boss. That’s what propels
a basement inventor to sell a new product – or an amateur chef to open a restaurant. It’s this promise
111
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law the Small Business Jobs Act (the “Act”),119 which authorized the
establishment of the Small Business Lending Fund Program (that was
administered by the Treasury Department) in order to “increase the
availability of credit for small businesses.”120 While from the outset it was
admirable that the administration was concerned with small businesses and
introduced legislation aimed at boosting the economy by creating jobs, there
were some issues with the Act that should be addressed.
For example, there should be a distinction between an innovation driven
entrepreneurial firm and a small medium business enterprise.121 As
journalist Annie Lowery puts it, “[s]cupper the image of Mark Zuckerberg
handcrafting a new service to revolutionize how we socialize and adding
thousands of jobs to the economy. Replace it with the image of a gas-station
owner, servicing a crowded market, happy to be able to make his kid's
soccer games without a boss breathing down his neck, and more wary of
innovation than eager for it.”122
Several scholars123 have attempted to define what constitutes an
“entrepreneur,” and show that the classic small business owner is different
than the innovation driven entrepreneur.124 Erik Hurt and Benjamin
that has drawn millions to our shores and made our economy the envy of the world”).
119
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010).
120
See id. The Act authorizes the creation of the Small Business Lending Fund Program
administered by the Treasury Department to make capital investments in eligible institutions, in order
to increase the availability of credit for small businesses.
121
See Annie Lowrey, Why Small Businesses Aren't Innovative, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/small_business/2011/09/why_small_businesses_arent_innovati
ve.html (“The bulk of small businesses being created, in short, are not particularly innovative ones. Few
spend any money on research or development, getting a patent, or otherwise trademarking a new idea.
Most simply help provide already-crowded markets with familiar goods such as legal work or gas or
nearby groceries. Nor are they growing businesses either”). See also Aulet & Murray, supra note 1
(MIT professors Aulet and Murray on the difference between the two definitions: “Not all startup
companies are created equal. Although both innovation-driven enterprises (IDEs) and traditional smalland medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can provide valuable products and services and create jobs, IDEs
– startups focused on addressing global markets based on technological, process or business model
innovation – can potentially create hundreds or even thousands of high-skill jobs if they succeed”).
122
See Lowrey, supra note 121.
123
See Erik Hurst & Benjamin Wild Pugsley, What Do Small Businesses Do? 73-75 (Brookings
Papers
on
Economic
Activity,
Fall
2011),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/2011_fall_bpea_conference_hurst.pdf (“[E]conomic theory usually considers
entrepreneurs as individuals who (1) innovate and render aging technologies obsolete (Schumpeter,
1942), (2) take economic risks (Knight (1921); Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979); Kanbur (1979), and
Jovanovic (1979)), or (3) are considered jacks-of-all-trades in the sense that they have a broad skill set
(Lazear, 2005). Policy makers often consider entrepreneurs to be job creators or the engines of economic
growth”).
124
Id. (discussing the distinction between small businesses that intend to innovate and small business
participants that “provide a relatively standardized good or service to an existing customer base.
Specifically, these industries primarily include skilled craftsmen (e.g., plumbers, electricians,
contractors, and painters), skilled professionals (e.g., lawyers, accountants, and architects), insurance
and real estate agents, doctors, dentists, mechanics, beauticians, restaurateurs, and small shop keepers
(e.g., gas station owners and grocery store owners)”).
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Pugsley125 demonstrate in a new study that the distinction between the small
business owner and an innovation driven entrepreneur is very important
because most small businesses do not innovate, remain small in size
throughout their existence and do not provide the desired job creation that
policy makers are intending to create. Moreover, Hurt and Pugsley also
illustrate how very few of the small businesses in the market actually spend
resources on innovation, such as filing for protection of intellectual property
rights (that include registering for a patent, copyright or trademark) or
investing in research or development.126
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (the “JOBS”) Act,127 which was
signed into law by President Barack Obama on April 5, 2012, is another
legislative effort worthy of mention. This Act has been met with mixed
reviews and reactions.128 On one hand, entrepreneurs and emerging growth
companies are able to use novel practices in order to raise capital.129 On the
other hand, critics (securities regulators, consumer and investor advocates)
worry about Ponzi schemes and the future potential fraud to unaccredited
investors. The media focuses on the aspect of crowdfunding.130 However,
there are various new ways of raising capital according to the JOBS Act.131
A comprehensive discussion of such securities laws concerns, as well as
other legal considerations, are outside the scope of this article, and should
be explored in additional research and commentary.132
125
Id. (explaining that “nearly half of all new businesses report providing an existing good or service
to an existing market”).
126
Id.
127
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 315 (2012)
(codified in scattered sections of Title 15 of United States Codes).
128
See Chatterji et al., supra note 113 (“The focus of the JOBS Act was on reducing the financial
reporting requirements for small firms and facilitating crowd funding, making it easier for individuals
to invest in or contribute funds to start-ups. It raised the limit of Regulation A securities offerings to $50
million, lifted the ban on general solicitation, and created a new class of companies—called emerging
growth companies—that will have fewer disclosure requirements”).
129
Anat Alon-Beck, The Law of Social Entrepreneurship - Creating Shared Value Through the Lens
of Sandra Day O'Connor's iCivics, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming), .
130
The SEC will make a final determination on this issue following a 90-day period for the public
to issue comments.
131
See Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, The JOBS Act Isn't All 'Crowdfunding,' FORBES (Oct. 8,
2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/08/the-jobs-act-isnt-all-crowdfunding/
(discussing the JOBS Act and explaining some of the main impacts, as follows: 1) There are special
rules for ‘Emerging Growth Companies’ in order to encourage initial public offering (IPO). Twitter just
used this provision for its IPO. 2) There will be significant changes to rules governing private offerings
with regards to General Solicitation and Accredited Investors. 3) The legalizing of crowd investing (vs.
crowdfunding). 4) Regulation A. 5) Private companies can remain private for a longer period of time as
the Act increases the limit on the number of shareholders that a company may have prior to being subject
to the Exchange Act annual reporting requirements).
132
See Chatterji et al., supra note 113 (“The federal government has also taken other lower profile
steps, under the banner of Startup America, to explicitly to promote high-growth entrepreneurship. The
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E. Criticism
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, governments have
experimented with vast public interventions both in the U.S. and other
Western economies.133 The U.S. government, like many Western
governments,134 focused on financing the mainly inadequately run and very
troubled firms in the economy.135
Both the Bush and Obama administrations tried to restart the market by
dealing with the "troubled assets" that were overcrowding the banks'
balance sheets—mainly due to housing-related loans and securities.136 In
September 2008, the Bush Administration proposed to use $700 billion of
public funds on direct purchases of these troubled assets.137 However, the
Bush administration eventually decided to call off this plan after running
into forceful opposition, especially since it seemed it would be hard for the
U.S. Treasury to assess the worth of these troubled assets.138
In March 2009, the Obama Administration announced a plan called the
“Public-Private Investment Program” for investing up to $ 1 trillion in order
to finance competing and privately managed funds devoted to buying these
troubled assets.139 If market crisis calls for immense public resources to be
used for interventions, then perhaps funds should be dedicated to advancing
new enterprises instead of exclusively being used for bailing out troubled
entities.140
Entrepreneurial businesses contribute to job creation as they employ
about half of the private-sector workers in the United States, and contribute
to market innovation as they generate “approximately half of non-farm
private GDP,” according to William Bygrave.141 This article calls for an
intense focus on entrepreneurship and venture capital as means of
Obama Administration modified the Small Business Investment Company program to offer two new $1
billion funds to invest in high-growth businesses. Several government agencies, including the SBA,
Veterans Affairs, and the Department of Energy have sponsored business accelerators. The USPTO also
announced a new fast track 12-month patent application process that is especially targeted at
entrepreneurial firms. The National Institutes of Health have simplified the process to license
technologies for biomedical start-ups”).
133
See also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 1.
134
The Swiss government infused $60 Billion into UBS in exchange for ten percent of the firm’s
equity. See id. at 1 (“UBS Given an Infusion of Capital”).
135
See id. (The US Government invested “over $150 Billion in AIG . . . in September and October
in exchange for 81 percent of the firm’s stock”).
136
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Buying Troubled Assets, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 343, 344 (2009).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 1; WILLIAM BYGRAVE, ANDREW
C. CORBETT & ANDREW ZACHARAKIS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 4 (2d ed. 2011).
141
See BYGRAVE & ZACHARAKIS, supra note 140, at 2.
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innovation that are the building blocks of our economy. In order to advance
significantly and reliably, U.S. regulators, as well as their international
counterparts, should concentrate on reviving the start-up market, with an
emphasis on innovative technology, venture capitalists and high-growth
entrepreneurial firms.
III. THE MATCHMAKER PUBLIC-PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUND INITIATIVE
The Matchmaker public-private venture capital investment fund
initiative builds on the Coalition Model, in order to proactively promote
innovation, technology and new venture formation, while also bridging
some of the financial inefficiencies and information gaps associated with
investment in early-stage innovation driven enterprises. It encourages U.S.
government agencies to fund research and innovation by identifying
specific technological challenges and collaborating with audiences in the
public sector, research institutions and universities, and private corporations
in order to advance commercialization efforts based on these challenges.
There are several potential benefits to adopting such a proactive policy.
First, it might encourage future engineers, scientists and innovators to take
a risk and become entrepreneurs. Second, it provides direct funding to
research and development needs that might otherwise not be used. Third, it
can signal that there are opportunities for private investors to invest in such
ventures, and perhaps even serve as some sort of certification. Fourth, it will
create a direct pathway for small firms to access government procurement.
The “Matchmaker” initiative is a promising targeted policy endeavor
aimed at designing a platform for a competitive venture capital industry in
the United States that promotes venture capital investment in early stage
technology firms (start-ups). The proposed design is intended to attract the
participation of professional venture capital fund managers (from the
private market) to the Matchmaker initiative in order to produce publicprivate venture capital funds. The Matchmaker venture capital funds will be
legally separate and independent of the government and will focus on
making equity investments in private-sector early stage start-up firms while
using government-supplied funds.
Another benefit of the Matchmaker funds would be the advancement of
continuous procurement relationships between the government agency that
will provide the funding and the technology companies that the funds will
invest in. This initiative will allow the government agencies to secure
innovative technology that will be updated according to the constantly
developing needs of the commercial market, to keep up with technology
advancement, and to secure funds for its research and development
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missions.
The purpose of this initiative is not to create a new high-technology
industry, but rather to create a platform for investment in early stage
technology innovations, research and development. It is based on the
successful Israeli Yozma Program142 as well as on the experience of the
success story of Silicon Valley.143
A. The Reasons for Government Intervention in the Current Market
The following are various reasons that require government intervention
in the market in the form of the proposed Matchmaker initiative. First,
economic analysis encourages government to present subsidies to small
high-technology firms because the social returns from such firms’ research
and development expenses might surpass their private returns.144 The social
return to the government is much greater than to private investors145 because
private investors cannot reap the full benefits of their investment through
profits where radical innovation is concerned.146 Moreover, some scholars
suggest that the spillover problems are predominantly acute among small
firms because they are commonly incapable of effectively defending their
intellectual property or extracting the majority of the rents in the product
142
See Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Evolutionary Targeting, 18 J. EVOL. ECON. 151, 159
(2008) [hereinafter Evolutionary Targeting] (“[T]he Yozma program [was] implemented during 19931998”). It was a policy that essentially created the platform for the Israeli venture capital industry. See
Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Evaluating Venture Capital Policies: Methodological Lessons from
the Israeli Experience 14, Paper Presented at the DRUID Summer Conference 2003 on Creating, Sharing
and Transferring Knowledge (June 2003) [hereinafter Methodological Lessons]. It should be noted that
the purpose of the Yozma Program was not to create a new high-technology industry, rather the venture
capital industry evolved from an existing Israeli foundation of high-technology capabilities, innovation,
research and development.
143
See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996) [hereinafter REGIONAL ADVANTAGE]; see also Ronald J. Gilson, The
Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128 and Covenants
not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 588 (1999); see also Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give
Me Death – The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon Valley, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS.
L.J. 265, 271 (2006).
144
See Josh Lerner, The Government as Venture Capitalist: The Long-Run Impact of the SBIR
Program, 72 J. BUS. 285 (1990) [hereinafter Venture Capitalist]; see Zvi Griliches, The Search for R&D
Spillovers, SCAND. J. ECON., Supp. 1992, at 29, (evaluating calculations of the social rates of return for
research and development).
145
See, e.g., Browyn H. Hall, The Private and Social Returns to Research and Development, in
TECHNOLOGY, R&D, AND THE ECONOMY 140 (Bruce L.R. Smith & Claude E. Barfield eds., The
Brookings Institution 1995) (providing evidence that the social return to R&D is much above the private
return); see Yoram Margalioth, Not A Panacea for Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated
Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493 (2007); see also Griliches, supra note 144, at 251-52.
146
See, e.g., Hall, supra note 145; see Margalioth, supra note 145; see also Griliches, supra note
144, at 252.
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market.147
Second, by giving awards to start-up firms, the government is certifying
these start-ups to the private market. The offering of a start-up company’s
equity may be associated with the “lemons” problem and “adverse
selection.”148 As noted earlier in this Article, there is a financing and
information gap, which is called the “Valley of Death.”149 The Valley of
Death describes the financial difficulties that start-up firms experience in
the early-stage of their companies’ technology development, which is the
stage between the early stage of discovery (that is generated from basic
research) to the later stage of commercialization of the product or process.
It results from the uncertainty, high-risk and information asymmetry
problem, which is associated with investing in start-ups, and precludes
investors from backing such firms.
The following are five broad stages in the innovation process, as well as
the financial sources that are usually available to start-up at these stages.
First, the stage of basic research, where funding is usually available to
entrepreneurs from government sources like NSF, NIH, SBIR phase I, and
from private corporate resources such as funding that large corporations
allocate for the purposes of research and development; second, the stage of
proof of concept or invention, where financing sources usually include
private Angel investors, corporate research and development funds,
government funding from SBIR phase II and technology labs; third, the
147
See Venture Capitalist, supra note 144; see also Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates
of Return from Industrial Innovations, 91 Q. J. ECON. 221, 234 (1977).
148
See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 493 (1970) (discussing the “adverse selection” problem, as well as
firms’ offerings of equity that may be associated with the “lemons” problem); see also Manuel Utset,
Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture Capital Financed
Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 56 (2002); see also PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE
CAPITAL CYCLE 129 (1999).
149
See Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J BUS. VENTURING
97 (1988) (“67% of new businesses fail and discontinue within four years”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SMALL BUSINESS EFFORTS TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 19 (2000),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/230896.pdf (“[A]pproximately 80% of new businesses . . . fail or no
longer exist within 5 to 7 years of formation due to a lack of financial depth, a lack of management
expertise, an unworkable business idea, or some combination of these factors. The perceived high risk
associated with new and rapidly growing companies is also borne out by the past performance of venture
capital investments in the informal, unregulated equity capital market. According to a recent study by
the National Association of Seed and Venture Funds, only about 10 percent of venture capital
investments meet their expected rate of return”); THOMAS ZIMMERER & NORMAN M. SCARBOROUGH,
ESSENTIALS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 10 (3d ed. 2002) (asserting
that 24% of small businesses fail within two years and 63% fail within six years); Amy E. Knaup,
Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics Data, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2005, at 50, 51 (stating that 34% of new businesses fail within their first two
years and 56% fail within four years).
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early-stage technology development stage, which is often termed as the
Valley of Death because of the entrepreneur’s hardship in getting financing
for this stage; fourth, the stage of product development, where private
venture capitalist traditionally invest in start-up firms; fifth and last, the
production or marketing stage, where financing sources include private
venture capitalists, corporate venture capital, private equity or commercial
debt.
The Valley of Death can have a considerable effect on the productivity
of government supported research and development efforts,150 especially
since an alarming study by Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner explains that
there is a ninety percent failure rate among early-stage firms who could not
get venture capital backing.151 If the government will intervene and give
awards to such firms, it will also certify the firms to private investors. Such
certification can tackle the informational asymmetries problem that
otherwise precludes investments.152
Therefore, there is a market need for government intervention in order
to encourage the creation, survival and growth of entrepreneurial firms,
since the government already spends money (in the first innovation stage)
in trying to boost research and development initiatives and “knowledge
spillovers” (an exchange of ideas among individuals).
Third, government intervention is primarily necessary at these times
when private investors effectively have no appetite for investing in risky
start-up companies.153 In recent years, large public firms are shying away
from investments in research and development initiatives due to a
philosophy of “shareholder primacy,” which precludes mangers from
pursuing long-term projects or investments in entrepreneurial firms with
uncertain returns154 because they are “exposed to ‘stock market sickness’ &
short-term thinking,” which results in very low “social impact.”155
Fourth and finally, due to the recent economic crisis and unstable
economic environment, even venture capital investors, who might
traditionally invest in such early innovation stages, are also reluctant to
150
Ford et al., supra note 5; see Branscomb & Auerswald, supra note 5; see also Auerswald et al.,
supra note 5.
151
Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New
Wealth, UBIQUITY (Jan. 2002), http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=763904; see also, U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 149, at 19 (approximately eighty percent of new businesses fail within
five to seven years from their formation).
152
See Venture Capitalist, supra note 144.
153
See Joseph A. McCahery et al., Corporate Venture Capital: From Venturing to Partnering, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 4 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012).
154
See SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH, supra note 6.
155
See also Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 14.

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5

2018]

THE COALITION MODEL

297

partake in such funding and prefer later stage investments.156
B. The Role of the Venture Capital Industry in the U.S. Innovation
Process
The venture capital industry has played, and continues to play, an
important role in the United States innovation process for the following
reasons. First, venture capitalists are active investors who provide many
value added services to the technology companies that they invest in. Such
services can vary, and include: strategic planning, mentoring, guidance,
selecting management, lawyers, accountants, writing a business plan, etc.157
Second, venture capitalists are fundamental to the formation of startup
firms.158 Third, venture capitalists are actively engaged with the following
innovation networks: global as well as local technology markets,159
financial institutions,160 specialized labor markets161 and professional
business service markets.162 Finally, venture capital investment spurs more
technological innovation than corporate venture capital investment.163
Venture capital firms use unique contracts and organizational
capabilities in order to overcome the uncertainty, risk, information
asymmetry, agency,164 “lemons” and “adverse selection”165 related
problems. The following are a few examples of studies that describe the
successful outcomes from the relationship between venture capital investors
and their portfolio firms in the United States (as compared to startup firms
that were not backed by venture capitalists).166 First, startup companies that
156

See McCahery et al., supra note 153, at 4.
For further information on services provided by VC, see GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148.
158
See Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 4.
159
See id.
160
See id.
161
See id.
162
See id.
163
See Samuel S. Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to
Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674 (2000) (Kortum and Lerner found that on average each dollar
invested by Venture Capital contributes to the rate of patents three to four times more than corporate
R&D. Moreover, from the late 1970’s to the mid 1990’s VC represented only three percent of corporate
R&D, but are responsible for ten to twelve percent of privately funded innovation); see also Joseph
Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289, 289 (1999) (reviewing tax
treatment of startups).
164
See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148, at 129.
165
Akerlof, supra note 148, at 493; see also Utset, supra note 148, at 56; see also GOMPERS &
LERNER, supra note 148, at 129.
166
It should be noted that the research based on the Israeli VC industry showed similar results
concerning the performance of venture capital backed firms. According to Avnimelech and Teubal, this
includes a “higher success rate (Exit rate: IPO or M&A), younger age at IPO, higher IPO valuation, and
higher growth in sales.” Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 5.
157
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are backed-up by venture capitalists enjoy a greater access to global
markets.167 Second, venture capital investors enable their portfolio
companies to go public faster (it seems that investor uncertainty is reduced
due to venture capital presence and monitoring), and, in effect, help their
portfolio companies to get lower interest rates on bank loans.168 Third, there
is superior overall post initial public offering performance of venture capital
backed portfolio firms, both in terms of overall growth rate and stock
price.169 Finally, venture capital backed firms invest a larger fraction of their
total expenses in research and development, as well as have higher growth
rates in terms of revenues and assets.170
C. The Initiative – Governance Mechanisms
The initiative proposes to establish public-private equity funds, which
will be organized as independent not-for-profit corporations, in order to
bridge the financial and information gap between budding commercial
innovation and the technology needs of a participating government
agency.171 There is extensive literature on regulatory capture, which
167

See Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 4.
See William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial
Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879, 882-83 (1991); see also Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role of Venture
Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence from the Going-Public Process, 27 J. FIN. ECON.
447, 449-50 (1990) (It appears that “venture capitalists are able to bring public the firms they back earlier
than would have otherwise been possible”). This likely occurs because of the industries in which the
venture capitalists focus. Venture capitalists take a monitoring role, demonstrated by serving on the
board, maintaining the investment beyond the IPO, and holding a large equity position in a portfolio
firm. Investor uncertainty is reduced with the quality of the venture capitalist's monitoring skill. A
decrease in investor uncertainty was found to decrease IPO underpricing. These findings support the
notion that venture capitalists play an important role in new enterprise.
169
See Megginson & Weiss, supra note 168, at 879 (comparison of venture capital backed IPOs
with non-venture capital backed IPOs from 1983 through 1987, which are “matched as closely as
possible by industry and offering size.” They conclude that the presence of venture capitalists (in the
issuing firms) serves to “lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the
offering firm”); see also Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 5.
170
See William L. Megginson, Toward a Global Model of Venture Capital?, 16 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 89 (2005) (“Venture capitalists create value through their role as active investors, and government
and business leaders around the world have come to realize that venture capital and private equity
investing can be a significant force in promoting economic development and technological progress. In
general, countries with English common law codes offer greater protection to investors; the ratio of
venture capital spending to GDP for common law countries is nearly double that in civil law countries.
Government efforts to promote venture capital would probably be better focused on eliminating
regulatory road-blocks, lowering taxes, and providing a favorable investor climate”); see also
Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 5.
171
See John T. Reinert, Comment, In-Q-Tel: The Central Intelligence Agency as Venture Capitalist,
33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 677, 679 (2013) (noting that there are attempts/desires by government
agencies (Army, NASA & USA Postal Service) to invest in technology ventures); He cites Memo to
Techies: This Army Wants Your Energy Ideas, WALL ST. J.: Deals & Deal Makers, May 9, 2003, at C5;
News Release, NASA Forms Partnership with Red Planet Capital, Inc., NASA (Sept. 20, 2006),
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2006/sep/HQ_06317_red_capital.html; see also Marc Kaufman,
168
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suggests that government involvement in the market may be distorted as a
result of politicians or interest groups that wish to use the intervention for
their own private benefit.172 The following design will try to prevent the
regulatory capture from the government investment, by structuring the
Matchmaker funds as independent bodies with autonomous management
(and private market incentives).173
1. The “General Partner”
Each participating federal agency will appoint independent private
investment professionals to manage its Matchmaker fund. Reputable and
established private equity managers (and staff) will be recruited from the
private venture capital industry and will be granted competitive (compared
to private industry) compensation schemes.174
The track record of a venture capital fund manager is extremely
important for several reasons. First, entrepreneurs prefer to work with fund
managers who have a good track record of making successful deals and a
lot of money in the past. These managers will stand a better chance of
getting into the best deals in the future than managers with no experience in
NASA Invests in Its Future with Venture Capital Firm, WASH. POST Oct. 31, 2006, at A19; Joe Davidson,
Postal Service Desperate for Good Ideas, WASH. POST, June 23, 2010, at B03.
172
See generally George Stigler, The Economic Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971); see Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211,
245 (1976); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148, at 315 (“the theory of regulatory capture
suggests that direct and indirect subsidies will be captured by groups that stand to gain substantial
benefits and whose collective political activity is not too difficult to arrange”).
173
BUS. EXEC. FOR NAT’L SEC., ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTELLIGENCE: THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
IN-Q-TEL
VENTURE
6
(2001),
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/inqtel/inqtel80701rpt.pdf [hereinafter BENS REPORT]; see also IAN
MACMILLAN ET AL., CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL: SEEKING INNOVATION AND STRATEGIC GROWTH
(2008). In this study, the U.S. federal government pays attention to the rising role of corporate venture
capital (CVC) in technology innovation. See also Connie K. N. Chang, Stephanie S. Shipp & Andrew J.
Wang, The Advanced Technology Program: A Public-Private Partnership for Early Stage Technology
Development, 4 VENTURE CAPITAL: AN INT’L J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 363 (2002) for an example
(from 1990 to 2007) where the U.S. government attempts to act as a catalyst for innovation, by providing
funding to research institutions; see also Maryann P. Feldman & Maryellen R. Kelley, Leveraging
Research and Development: Assessing the Impact of the U.S. Advanced Technology Program, 20 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 153, 163 (2003) (evaluating the successful results of the ATP program & the companies
that received funding from ATP); In 2007, ATP was replaced by the Technology Innovation Program
(TIP) Program; see generally, Technology Innovation Program, NIST, http://www.nist.gov/tip (last
visited Apr. 16, 2018); see also America Competes Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, § 3012, 121 Stat. 572, 593
(2007); see also Josh Lerner, When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective “Public
Venture Capital” Programs, ECON. J., Feb. 2002, at F73, F80 [hereinafter Bureaucrats Meet
Entrepreneurs]; see also Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital
to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 675 (2000).
174
See Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs, supra note 173.
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the industry. Additionally, managers with good records will typically have
already built strong networks, so they can help their portfolio companies
with introductions to potential customers and possible partners. Finally, the
government agency must take into account the manager’s commitment as
well as past experience with early-stage investment in entrepreneurial firms.
The managers will act similarly to “general partners” (who invest in and
manage the fund), whereas the government will act similarly to a “limited
partner” (who is passive and only invests money).
a) Compensation
It is extremely important to make sure that the Matchmaker managers
will be properly compensated for the fund to be successful and to prevent
the situation of a revolving door (when a manager in a public position leaves
for a higher paid private position). Therefore, based on the Israeli case study,
and the Silicon Valley successful venture capital model, the managers will
be compensated with a share of the profits generated by the fund. The
government will pay them an annual management fee of two percent and a
carried interest of up to twenty percent of the profits of the fund (some
private equity funds today pay even more than that to their management).175
The mission of compensating managers of public funds in democracies
can be particularly difficult, according to Lerner.176 For example, the story
of the first government funded venture capital firm, In-Q-Tel, illustrates the
hardships of modeling government funds after private equity funds.177
In-Q-Tel was established in 1999178 in order to provide the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) with access to innovating technologies, by
investing in emerging firms (small stake investments) and by using venturelike processes.179 In order to encourage recruitment of established managers
175
This incentive mechanism is very common in Silicon Valley and is called “2 and 20.” See, e.g.,
Laura Saunders, Billionaires Decry “Carried Interest,” WALL ST. J.: TOTAL RETURN (Jan. 20, 2012,
4:05PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2012/01/20/billionaires-decry-carried-interest/; see also
DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY CONTRACTING:
AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3-5 (2009).
176
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 176.
177
Id.
178
During the time of its establishment, the idea of a government-funded venture capital firm was
entirely novel. See Steve Henn, In-Q-Tel: The CIA's Tax-Funded Player in Silicon Valley, NPR (July
16, 2012, 9:43AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/07/16/156839153/in-q-tel-thecias-tax-funded-player-in-silicon-valley (“Whether you have realized it or not, over the past 13 years InQ-Tel has changed your life. ‘Much of the touch-screen technology used now in iPads and other things
came out of various companies that In-Q-Tel identified,’ Smith says”); see also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN
DREAMS, supra note 34, at 176 (“For many of the start-ups, which had targeted corporate customers, the
challenges of breaking into government procurements were daunting”).
179
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 176 (In-Q-Tel also served as a bridge
that was able to present new firms to the portfolio of the CIA and to underline the role of the government
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and staff from the venture capital industry, and to prevent them from leaving
to more lucrative private positions, the CIA offered a rewarding
compensation scheme, which was very unusual compared to typical
government jobs.180 The compensation included a flat salary, a bonus paid
based on how well In-Q-Tel met government needs, and an employee
investment program, which took a pre-specified portion of each employees
salary and invested alongside the portfolio.181 After a few successful years,
newspapers, like the New York Post,182 criticized this compensation model,
accusing its managers of using taxpayers’ money for their own personal
benefit,183 even though the model was successful and very acceptable in the
private world.
b) Incentives & Safeguards
Despite potential criticism, this article recommends compensating the
managers of the Matchmaker fund according to the private market, so that
the managers will have incentives for the fund to grow. It is important to
note further that there is an inherent risk for possible abuses by
management, or conflicts of interest. Therefore, the following four
important safeguards will need to be instituted.
First, in order to hold the managers accountable to their investment
decisions, they will be required to bring their own capital to the fund. The
participating federal agency of each Matchmaker fund will determine the
as a new customer for products developed that were by emerging growth firms); see also BENS REPORT,
supra note 173 (“Unlike a true venture capital model, In-Q-Tel is more aptly described as a ‘technology
accelerator,’ seeking speed and agility in discovering innovative IT solutions for the Agency. In-Q-Tel
differs from private venture capital models in the following ways. In-Q-Tel: Places its value proposition
on obtaining IT solutions, not foremost on return on equity or asset; Deals always result in a product or
service (e.g. feasibility assessment, test product or prototype); Investments are more likely to provide
value to the portfolio companies beyond cash: Investment is ”smart money” in its portfolio companies;
that is, In-Q-Tel provides portfolio companies with intellectual capital, technology-related experience
and the Agency as a potential test-bed; and Due diligence process is more strict: In-depth investigation
into the company’s structure and financial status as well as the ability of the proposed technology to
meet the Agency problem domain is completely evaluated before forming a contract”); see also Reinert,
supra note 171, at 679.
180
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 176.
181
For example, in 2012, its CEO, Christopher Darby, earned roughly $1 million. See Henn, supra
note 178.
182
Christopher Byron, Penny Stock Spies, N.Y. POST (April 25, 2005),
http://www.rgmcom.com/articles/nypost17.html.
183
Id. (These compensation arrangements, especially allowing the In-Q-Tel employees to invest
alongside the portfolio investments, according to the New York Post, were “almost identical to the socalled ‘Raptor’ partnerships through which top officials at Enron Corp were able to cash in personally
on investment activities of the very company that employed them”); see also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN
DREAMS, supra note 34, at 178.
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amount of capital required as well as initiate a competitive bidding process
for the fund manager positions.
Second, in addition to bringing their own capital, the managers will be
required to line up investments from other private investors and legitimate
accountable sources. If a considerable share of the Matchmaker funds
arrives from the private managers, then they are expected to concentrate on
making sure that their investments thrive, as noted earlier by Lerner184 and
the Israeli government’s example. Lerner described the reasons for the
failure of the New York City Discovery Fund, which did not demand the
fund’s managing groups to match any funds that were invested by the
city.185
Third, it is important to design the model so that the private sector
partners only do well if the investments generate a good return.
Fourth, the future investment goals must be clear and defined, and linked
to the wider targets of the federal agency that launches this model.186
c) Bidding Process
The following are the ways in which the prospective Matchmaker fund
managers can compete for the right to participate in the program. First, they
will need to commit a certain maximum portion of capital that they will be
willing to commit and contribute as private equity capital. Second, they will
need to specify the size of the fund that they seek to establish. Third, there
will be an evaluation of the managers’ reputation, previous achievements
and previous dedication to small and medium enterprises and involvement
with the other stakeholders. Fourth and finally, the federal agency will also
consider factors relating to the fund’s long-term strategic investment
objective, as well as the industries and research that they would like to
promote.
d) Matching Component and Another Incentive to the
“Upside”

184
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 138-40 (“[M]any examples can illustrate
the real danger that the fund managers will have the wrong incentives. The Discovery Fund, for instance,
was a $76 million fund organized by New York City in 1995, with funding entirely from the public
sector and public utilities that focused on doing business in the city. The city hired a local venture group,
Prospect Street Ventures, to run the fund, which was launched with a great deal of fanfare, including
Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s pledge that it would generate 4,000 jobs. Yet the effort is generally regarded as
a failure. . . . It was natural to wonder whether the lack of demand for matching funds and the failure to
set a mandate that matched city’s economic development needs intensified the problems that the fund
encountered”).
185
Id.
186
Id. at 138.
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The following suggestion is based on the successful incentive
mechanism that was used by the Israeli government in the Yozma program.
The creativity of Yozma was in the design of the risk-reward model. While
the Israeli government collectively shared the risk with the foreign (and
local) investors, it offered the investors the potential to reap all of the
reward. In the same way, the federal government agency will share the risks
associated with establishing the Matchmaker funds with the private actors,
while also providing them with “incentives to the upside.”187
The long-term goal of the federal government agency, in this initiative
(unlike the In-Q-Tel example), is not to continue and remain an equity
holder in the funds. Instead, the agency would present the private managers
(general partners) with the option of inexpensively buying out its equity
stake, in the event that the fund becomes profitable.188 The agency stake in
the fund could be bought out once it had served its primary function (to
attract professional venture capital investors to invest in early stage
technology firms) rather than carry on indefinitely.
The “upside” is that the private fund managers have a “call option,” for
a period of five years, on the agency’s stake in fund. Therefore, in the event
that the fund becomes profitable, the private managers can buy the agency’s
stake at cost, plus a five to seven percent interest.189 For that reason, from
the fund manager’s standpoint, it is an extremely good deal.
The government agency will match a significant portion of the private
management investment in the fund. In the Israeli Yozma example, the
matching ratio was one to one, and the government only maintained a forty
percent equity stake in the Yozma funds.
This article supports the idea of private capital entities partaking in
government investment because it will increase the total capital introduced
into the market, and it gives the managers of the public-private fund
incentives to do well.
Additionally, the Matchmaker managers are encouraged in certain
situations to invest in conjunction with other venture capital firms.

187

See Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 159 (discussing Yozma’s incentives to the
“upside”).
188
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 178 (discussing In-Q-Tel employees
equity compensation).
189
See Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142.
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2. The Limited Partners
a) The U.S. government agency
There has to be a government agency that will be in charge of
supervising, forming, as well as encouraging other agencies to take part in
Matchmaker venture capital funds initiatives.
It is highly recommended that there is a specific agency that will be
tasked with supervising and managing this initiative. There are several
examples for the need to have a designated agency in charge of a
government initiative to support entrepreneurial firms, and research and
development. One example is the successful SBIR program, which was in
charge of mandating the eleven federal agencies (with extramural research
budgets in excess of $100 million) to assign a certain percentage190 of their
total extramural research and development budgets for grants or contracts
to small businesses.191
Another example is the Advanced Technology Program (ATP), which is
another successful public-private partnership example,192 of United States
government providing funding to research institutions in order to encourage
innovation. Moreover, in 2007, ATP was replaced by the Technology
Innovation Program (TIP) Program, which “provides cost-shared funding to
speed the development of high-risk, high-reward, transformative research.
This research is targeted to key societal challenges that are not being
addressed elsewhere.”193 TIP is part of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).
The agency will encourage other agencies to start their own or co-invest
in Matchmaker funds. There already is an example of a successful publicprivate venture capital fund. See In-Q-Tel, the CIA’s venture capital fund,
which was discussed above.194 There are also other attempts and desires by
190

For example, 2.8% of such budget in 2014.
See WESSNER, supra note 79 (The SBIR program does not fund ‘Phase III’ innovations, which
is a stage of development that is targeted under this initiative. Instead, funding is targeted to the precommercial stage of technology development); see also Keller & Block, supra note 84, at 640.
192
The ATP is an example of the US government acting as a catalyst for innovation, by providing
funding to research institutions. See Feldman & Kelley, supra note 173, at 163 (evaluating the successful
results of the ATP program and the companies that received funding from ATP). In 2007, ATP was
replaced by the Technology Innovation Program (TIP) Program.
193
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION PROGRAM: TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S FUTURE THROUGH
INNOVATION 1 (2009), http://www.nist.gov/tip/upload/tip_2009_annual_report.pdf (TIP defines a
societal challenge as “a problem or issue confronted by society that when not addressed could negatively
affect the overall function and quality of life of the Nation and as such justifies government attention.”);
see also Reinert, supra note 171.
194
However, it must be noted that the CIA enjoys a distinctive grant of discretionary power, which
according to Reinert, was made by the Second Continental Congress to Ben Franklin & to the Committee
of Secret Correspondence. See Reinert, supra note 171 (citing the CIA Act, which grants the CIA an
191
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various government agencies, such as the United States Army and the
United States Postal Service, to start their own public-private venture capital
funds.195 Other agencies, like NASA, have also started their own venture
capital firms (Red Planet Venture Capital firm).196
1.

Mission & Supervision

This initiative is also built on the belief that the private managers will be
subject to the oversight of the private market. The Matchmaker fund should
nevertheless be reviewed annually by the government agency (limited
partner) in order to determine the progress of the fund and whether
additional funding is required. Another option is to appoint an outside firm
that will review the Matchmaker fund on an annual basis.197 It should be
noted that the funds require long-term strategic goals. In order to evaluate
if the portfolio companies in the fund are meeting their expected rate of
return, it is common to allow technology companies five years and
biotechnology companies ten years. Moreover, usually only about ten
percent of the venture capital fund’s investment meet their projected rate of
return, but they are supposed to make up for the rest of the portfolio
companies that weren’t as successful.198
The Matchmaker initiative will also serve as a vehicle that will take to
the government agency privately developed innovative projects that can
serve the agency’s needs. The Initiative establishes a channel for private
firms to access government procurement and development, and for the
government firm to be able to catch up with the market’s technological
advancements.
A major benefit of the Matchmaker fund to both parties is the
introduction to continuous procurement opportunities between the
government agency (that provides the funding) and the private technology
companies that the fund will invest in. However, the fund should not be
measured on whether the government agency was able to use the technology
and improve its commercial needs. For that purpose, there should be another
extensive authority to expend funds “for purposes necessary to carry out [the CIA’s] functions”); See
Cent. Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, ch. 227, § 8(a), 68 Stat. 208, 212 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 403(j) (2006)).
195
See Reinert, supra note 171, at 680.
196
See id. For more information see NASA News Release, supra note 171. See also Kaufman, supra
note 171.
197
See Mark Muro, Economic Cluster Policy Begins to Work, BROOKINGS (July 9, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2013/07/09/economic-cluster-policy-begins-to-work/.
198
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 149, at 19 (“[O]nly about 10 percent of venture
capital investments meet their expected rate of return”).
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arm within the agency, which would be in charge of implementing these
changes.199
2. User-friendly Application Process
The Matchmaker initiative must have a user friendly and straightforward
application process (based on the Yozma vs. Inbal example), without
burdensome bureaucratic hurdles, reporting requirements and paperwork,
which are frequently coupled with other governmental programs.

b) Private Investors
The Matchmaker management is encouraged to bring on additional
sources of funding, including from private investors, who will also act as
limited partners. This initiative is built on the belief that other private
investors will be willing to trust the Matchmaker fund managers, and
accordingly invest in the fund, because the managers will be subject to the
oversight of the private market.
II. STARTUP NATION’S YOZMA INITIATIVE
In 1984, the Israeli government enacted the Law for the Encouragement
of Industrial Research and Development (1984), which establishes the
Office of the Chief Scientist (“OCS”), of the Ministry of Economy
(formerly known as the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor).200 The
Office of the Chief Scientist was established in order to supervise and
199
This suggestion is given due to recent critics who maintain that part of In-Q-Tel’s responsibilities
(and metrics for success) is to improve the agency’s technological advancement.
200
See Hedva Ber, Is Venture Capital Special? – Empirical Evidence from a Government Initiated
Venture Capital Market 8 (Samuel Neaman Institute: Science, Technology and the Economy, Working
Paper STE-WP-9, 2002)
[A] public committee had recommended various ways of encouraging venture capital in
order to boost economic growth in general, and the high-tech industry in particular (Securities
Authority, 1989). The committee stressed that government support for the VC industry should
have two aims—to make it easier to obtain finance for VC investment, and to create the
conditions for the development of a VC market, specializing primarily in managing investment
and encouraging the participation of specialized financial entities. In this context, it was decided
in 1991 to support the establishment of VC funds that would undertake and manage investments
in R&D; this would be achieved by providing government guarantees for the purchase of shares
in funds via the “Inbal” government insurance company. In this framework, three VC funds
were founded in 1991–93, whose investments were guaranteed by the state. At the next stage,
in 1992, at the initiative of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the “Yozma” government
VC fund was set up in order to establish VC funds in cooperation with private foreign investors,
and was allocated equity of $ 100 million. Until its dissolution, the fund, which was set up for
a limited period of seven years, supported the establishment of ten private VC management
funds, which together had raised capital of $ 2.7 billion by 2000.
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execute the government’s policy for support of industrial research and
development (“R&D”).201 The OCS’s main goals and incentives are to: (1)
aid in the development of technology in Israel as a means of promoting
economic progress; (2) increase the knowledge base of industry in Israel;
(3) encourage entrepreneurship and technological innovation; (4) strengthen
Israel’s scientific potential; and (5) fuel high value-added R&D and finally
stimulate R&D partnerships both in the national and international
communities.202
Additionally, the OCS constantly develops and offers a variety of
ongoing support programs that enable Israel to lead in high technology
entrepreneurship, both in the national and international arenas, and
collaborate in the cross-regional development and research efforts.203 Two
of the main strategic development programs, established in 1991-1992,
were the Technology Incubator program204 and the Yozma funds
initiative.205 The Technology Incubator is outside the scope of this article
and is discussed in a separate article.
Economists Gil Avnimelech and Morris Teubal argue that Yozma (a
government targeted program) and the emergence of a venture capital
industry in Israel are distinctive examples that may possibly inspire future
government design of a set of “infant industry” support programs.206 These
examples, moreover, can play a significant role in distinguishing the
guidelines for “evolutionary targeting,”207 and identifying the “required set
201
See Israel Innovaion Center (formerly the Office of the Chief Scientist and MATIMOP),
http://www.matimop.org.il/.
202
Id.
203
See id. (There are many programs, such as the following: the Heznek-Seed Fund (the government
matches an investment in a seed company, and later on, when the company is successful, gives the
investors the option of purchasing the government’s shares); the Tnufa Program (is intended to aid the
entrepreneur in her preliminary endeavors to build a prototype, design a business plan, and register a
patent); the Magneton and Noffar programs (are designed to encourage applied academic research in
order to promote technology transfer to industry); and the Magnet Program (encourage formation of
consortia that is comprised of academic institutions and individual firms in order to develop preISRAEL
BUS.
CONNECTION,
competitive
technologies).
See
also
R&D
Funds,
http://www.israelbusiness.org.il/financialassistance/rdfound (last visited May 1, 2018).
204
See Lesha R. Chaifetz, The Promised Land: An Examination of the Israeli High-Tech Industry,
23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 385, 389 (2002).
205
Overview: Creating a Professionally Managed Venture Capital Market in Isreal, THE YOZMA
GROUP (2000), http://www.yozma.com/overview/.
206
Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 154.
207
Id. at 160:
Evolutionary Targeting is one aspect of the application of the system-evolutionary
perspective to ITP and to innovation-led and knowledge-based economic growth. Based on
market-led development processes accompanied by policy-enhancements at critical points, it
involves the design and implementation of targeted programs the objective of which is
promoting the emergence of a multiagent structure. Evolutionary Targeting operates by
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of pre-emergence conditions of industry emergence.”208

A. The “Yozma” Funds Initiative
In 1992, the Israeli government decided to intervene in the market and
act as a venture capitalist.209 The Israeli government established a $100
million fund, which was wholly owned by the public sector, called the
Yozma Venture Capital Ltd.210 The main goals of the Yozma initiative were
to create a platform in order to stimulate and encourage international
venture capital investments in Israeli firms, as well as establish ten new
venture capital funds in order to encourage future formations of local Israeli
venture capital funds.211
The Yozma program has the following three innovative fundamental
characteristics. First, the Israeli government deliberately established
privately owned (and managed) venture capital funds, which had a clear
government component.212 The Yozma initiative is an example of a
successful private-public-partnership model. Each of the ten original dropdown funds participating in the Yozma program had to be represented by
the following private and public partners. The public party was the Israeli
government, and the private parties were Israeli venture capitalists in
training, a foreign venture capital firm, and an Israeli investment company
triggering and enhancing cumulative processes. The central idea behind the actual targeting is
to leverage existing high quality (Class A) market forces for the purpose of building multiagent
structures. Evolutionary Targeting differs from the old “picking-winners” policy and from
Korea’s post 1960s targeting (both of which are based on policy-led mechanisms), and from
fully unprompted market-led processes. It is based on a new, market- friendly and bottom–up
view of targeting industries. It operates by enhancing market-led variety and pre-selection
through
horizontal
policies,
and
accelerating
market-led
selection
and
development/reproduction processes through coordination activities, targeted incentives,
institutional changes, and other policies. Evolutionary Targeting involves a number of policies
and policy actions related to multiagent structures: (1) promotion of pre-emergence conditions
to generate policy targeting candidates (variation); (2) determination of relevant criteria for
socially desirable multiagent structures and selection of those to be targeted; (3) identification
of system and market failures blocking the unaided emergence of selected multiagent
structures; (4) determination of targeted policy objectives, design, timing, and implementation
oriented to triggering (or reinforcing) and sustaining cumulative emergence processes; and (5)
termination of targeted support.
208
Id. at 155.
209
Id. at 157 n.5, 161 (“Yozma is a case of a successful targeted program, which followed 24 years
horizontal grants to business sector R&D programs . . . . The motivation for this program was the need
to solve a specific problem—the post R&D commercial failure of large numbers of Israeli startups during
the second half of the 1980s”).
210
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 156-57.
211
See DAN SENOR & SAUL SINGER, START-UP NATION: THE STORY OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC
MIRACLE 161 (Grand Central Publishing 2011).
212
Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 159.
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or a bank.213
Second, the Israeli government required Israeli venture capital firms to
partner with foreign venture capital firms.214 The Yozma initiative was able
to attract foreign investors by using a relatively unique financial model
whereby the Israeli government agreed to match funds to any foreign
international venture capital fund (as well as local Israeli venture capitalist)
that agreed to invest money in the partnership. The Israeli government
would match a significant portion of the joint investment; however, the
partnership would also have to include an Israeli investment group215 so that
the Israelis could learn from the seasoned foreign venture capitalists. The
Israeli government generally took a forty (40) percent equity stake in the
newly established private-public partnership venture capital fund.216
Third, the Israeli government shared the risk in establishing the funds
with the private actors, as well as provided additional “incentives to the
upside” to the private actors.217 It should be noted that the long-term goal of
the Israeli government was not to continue and remain an equity holder in
the private-public partnership venture capital funds. Instead, the
government would present the private partners with the option of
inexpensively buying out its equity stake, in the event that the fund was
profitable.218 The ingenuity of the Yozma initiative was in the risk-reward
model. While the Israeli government collectively shared the risk with the
foreign (and local) investors, it offered the investors the potential to reap all
of the reward.219 The Israeli government could be bought out once it had
served its primary function (to attract foreign investment and start the fund,
rather than carry on indefinitely). The “upside” was that in the event that the
future venture capital funds became profitable, then the private investors
would have a “call option” on the Israeli government’s shares. The call
option was for a period of five years, at cost, plus a five to seven percent
213
Additionally, the Israeli government designated one $20 million Yozma fund solely to directly
invest in technology companies; see SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211, at 156.
214
Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 159.
215
Id.
216
“Yozma was the outcome of an interactive policy process that included the Treasury, the private
sector, and foreign investors. The government participated in the formation of ten privately owned
venture funds and contributed 40% of each fund’s capital. The focus was on seed and early stage
investments in technology startups.” See TUCK SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AT DARTMOUTH: CENTER FOR
PRIVATE EQUITY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, NOTE ON PRIVATE EQUITY IN ISRAEL (last updated Aug. 2,
2005), http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/uploads/centers/files/israel.pdf.
217
Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 162 n.12.
218
Id.
219
Id.

Washington University Open Scholarship

310

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:267

interest.220 Therefore, from an investor’s standpoint it was an extremely
good deal.221
B. The Need for Israeli Government Intervention in the Market
The reasons to why the Israeli government decided to intervene in the
market are different than the current conditions in the U.S. market. Prior to
Yozma, there was only one venture fund active in the nation, Athena
Venture Partners.222 During that period (around 1993), Israeli entrepreneurs
had difficulty with getting venture capital financing.223 In order to get
funding for their projects, Israeli entrepreneurs had to turn to the following
limited avenues: apply to the Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) for
matching grants,224 apply for Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and
Development (“BIRD”) foundation grants,225 use connections and personal
220
Id. (According to Avnimelech and Teubal, Yozma “did not provide guarantees nor tax benefits;
nor was it accompanied by new regulation rules for Pension Funds (Capital Gains tax was relatively low
at the time and Pension Funds were allowed to invest a small amount on VC subject to Government
regulation. In both respects Israel’s situation was ‘level playing field’ with that of other countries at the
time)”). “Yozma did not simply provide supply, risk sharing incentives to investors-- as was common
in other Government VC support programs (it did not provide guarantees nor tax benefits; nor was it
accompanied by new regulation rules for Pension Funds18); its main incentive was in the ‘upside’ that
is when VC investments where very profitable. Each Yozma fund had a call option on Government
shares, at cost (plus 5-7% interest) and for a period of five (5) years.” Methodological Lessons, supra
note 142, at 15.
221
Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 162.
222
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34.
223
Evolutionary Targeting, supra note 142, at 159-60:
During pre-emergence (1985–1992) a number of critical dynamic sub-processes operated
which led to ‘selection’ or ‘identification of focal points’ of the future high tech cluster. Thus,
through the activity of numerous market agents who undertook trial and error activities with
respect to organization of VC and startup companies, and through government policy
experimentation and learning, a consensus was arrived at as to the desirable characteristics of
VC and startup companies—born global startups, which also focus on global capital and
product markets; and LP VCs oriented to early phase finance and support of high tech startup
(with an additional focus on software and communications technologies). At some point during
early emergence (1993–1995) this led to an accelerated entry of VC companies fed by a
cumulative process with positive feedback. It is then that the industry attained a size, which
enabled it to sustain a large number of supporting institution and services. The strong selection
and reproduction processes that operated during the emergence led both to acceleration of
activity and to the reconfiguration of the high tech cluster.”
224
See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211.
225
See Encouragement for Industrial R&D in Israel, STATE OF ISRAEL MINISTRY OF INDUS. &
TRADE OF THE CHIEF SCIENTIST, http://www.donner-tech.com/israeli_r_d_law.pdf (last visited Apr. 18,
2018); see also What is BIRD, BIRD FOUNDATION, http://www.birdf.com/What-is-BIRD/ (last visited
Nov. 12, 2017) (according to the BIRD Foundation’s statement, it “was established by the U.S. and
Israeli governments in 1977 to generate mutually beneficial cooperation between the private sectors of
the U.S. and Israeli high tech industries, including start-ups and established organizations. BIRD
provides both matchmaking services between U.S. and Israeli companies, as well as funding covering
up to 50 percent of project development and product commercialization costs. . . . BIRD supports
approximately 20 projects annually. The cumulative sales of products developed through BIRD projects
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resources (the art of “bootstrapping”),226 or depend on bank debt
financing,227 which was seldom granted to entrepreneurs with immature and
uncertain ideas or projects.
The problem that the Israeli government tried to solve was that, even
though entrepreneurs were meeting their scientific objectives and working
on promising technologies, they were unable to raise the funds to further
develop and commercialize their products.228
The other major objective for Yozma was to attract foreign venture
capital funds to invest in Israeli firms.229 Venture capital investors
traditionally invested in firms in close proximity to their geographic
location. Therefore, the Israeli government needed to give foreign venture
capital investors substantial incentives in order to buy into the Yozma
program. It was not financing alone that the government wanted to
encourage, but also the venture capital value added services that
traditionally accompanied the investment, such as mentoring, networking,
evaluation of business plans and commercial feasibility of the invention.230

have exceeded $8 billion. Since its inception in 1977, BIRD has approved over 800 projects with leading
companies in the U.S., for example: ADM, American Red Cross, Applied Materials, Avaya, Bayer
Pharmaceutical, Becton Dickinson, Bio-Rad Laboratories, Eastman Kodak, General Dynamics, General
Electric, Guidant, IBM, J&J, KLA- Tencor, Molex, Motorola, Procter & Gamble, SanDisk, Spansion,
Telcordia, Texas Instruments, Tyco and others”); see SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211 (“[Y]et 74% of
high-tech exports out of Israel were generated by just 4% of high-tech companies”).
226
See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211.
227
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 156.
228
Id.; see also Gil Avnimelech, A Five-phase Entrepreneurial Oriented Innovation and Technology
Policy Profile: The Israeli Experience, 16 EUR. PLAN. STUD. 81, 88 (2008) (“[P]olicy-makers believed
that the way to overcome these deficiencies was to foster a domestic VC industry, which then became a
strategic priority. The outcome was two VC-directed programmes - Inbal (since 1991), which failed;
and Yozma (implemented during 1993–1997), which was very successful and was credited with
triggering the creation of the domestic VC industry. The critical design dimensions of the Yozma
programme dealt with the specific system failures blocking the VC emergence in Israel”) (citations
omitted).
229
See also id. at 91-92 (“During Israel’s VC industry pre-emergence phase (1985–1992), a
considerable amount of business experiments took place; which facilitated identification of the basic
design features of the future VC targeted programme. These experiments pertained to start-up and VC
companies and activities. There was learning about a new start-up business model, which is oriented
from “day-one” to global product and capital markets with strong implications for its strategy. For
example, it became increasingly important and recognized that start-ups must from year one search for
linkages with the leading high-tech clusters and markets. Moreover, it became increasingly important to
adopt US security and exchange commission standards and accountancy rules and other attire of US
high-tech companies. Some of the start-ups were successful and pointed the way to others. Business
experiments and learning also occurred in relation to VC companies and activities”) (citation omitted).
230
Id.
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C. Inbal (Israeli Government Intervention that Failed) led to Yozma
Israeli policy makers came up with the Yozma model, following
experimentation and an extensive lengthy preparation, which involved the
search for the possible causes for the problem of the weak “economic impact
of companies having received R&D subsidies from the OCS.”231 According
to economist Avnimelech, Israeli policy makers tried to learn from the
successful story of Silicon Valley. Accordingly, many OCS officers visited
Silicon Valley, conducted interviews with various US stakeholder groups,
such as venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, officers of the small business
administration, and with investment banks.232
The first Israeli government targeted attempt at creating a venture capital
industry, which was via the implementation of the Inbal program, was
actually unsuccessful. The Inbal (government insurance company) program,
which was launched in 1991, prior to Yozma, was an effort by the Israeli
government to stimulate publicly traded venture capital funds by essentially
“guaranteeing the downside of their investments.”233 The Israeli
government (via Inbal) guaranteed up to seventy percent of the initial capital
assets of the four Inbal venture capital funds that were traded on the Israeli
stock market.234 Moreover, the managers of the Inbal funds had to deal with
certain restrictions on their investments, as well as with government
bureaucracy and preparation of lengthy and cumbersome periodic reports.235
The Inbal venture capital funds and the program were not successful.236
Israeli policy makers were able to draw the following conclusions due to
the failure of Inbal, which led to the development of Yozma.237 They needed
231
Id. at 12 (“The high impact of these search and learning processes was underpinned by the
successful development of experience-based policy capabilities at the OCS—the result of over 20 years
of operational experience in managing incentive programmes in support of R&D and innovation”).
232
Id. (“The high impact of these search and learning processes was underpinned by the successful
development of experience-based policy capabilities at the OCS—the result of over 20 years of
operational experience in managing incentive programmes in support of R&D and innovation”).
233
Id.
234
See Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Evolutionary Innovation and High Tech Policy: What Can
We Learn from Israel's Targeting of Venture Capital 8 (Samuel Neaman Institute: Science, Technology
and the Economy Program, Working Paper STE-WP-25, 2005) [hereinafter Targeting VC] (“Inbal
(1991) - a Government owned Insurance company, which gave partial (70%) guarantees to traded VC
funds. Four VC companies were established under Inbal regulations. This early VC support program
failed to create a VC industry”).
235
Id.; see also Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 14.
236
Targeting VC, supra note 234; see also Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 14.
237
See Gil Avnimelech, VC Policy: Yozma Program 15-Years perspective, (Presented at the DRUID
Conference, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758195 [hereinafter Yozma Program] (“Four sets of
factors seem to have been responsible for Yozma to become an effective trigger of Israel’s ICT Cluster:
a) favorable background conditions; b) policy and market forces’ experimentation during the preemergence period; c) timing - the time overlap between Yozma implementation on the one hand and the
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to develop a mechanism that would draw the participation of professional
venture capital agents in the Yozma program, in order to produce venture
capital funds that could provide Silicon Valley-like added services, such as
mentoring, networking, and evaluations of business plans.238 They decided
to select the limited partnership form (instead of publicly traded funds), for
the formation of the venture capital funds, and put emphasis on early stage
investment. According to economists Avnimelech and Teubal, another
reason for selecting the limited partnership model for Yozma had to do with
the experiences with the Inbal publicly traded venture capital funds that
were “exposed to ‘stock market sickness’ & short-term thinking,”239 which
resulted in very low “social impact.”240
The Inbal program had several weaknesses that Yozma was able to deal
with. First, investors in publicly traded venture capital funds had difficulty
with contributing to the operation of the fund.241 Second, publicly funded
venture capital funds (as compared to private ones) encountered more
difficulty with swiftly exploiting the reputation that is usually earned from
early exits, and, therefore, with raising new capital.242 Third, Inbal’s failure
was also due to the limits that it placed on the funds’ management
compensation as well as their decision-making ability.243 Finally, Inbal was
lacking in incentives for the “upside” and therefore did not attract
professional venture capitalists.244
The Yozma fund was accordingly designed in 1992 to overcome the
abovementioned challenges, and especially to create a platform for a
competitive venture capital industry in Israel.245 The Yozma program was
intended to create venture capital funds, which will be active and invest a
critical mass of capital in the Israeli market, while also collaborating with
(as well as learning from) foreign limited partners, and growing a network
of international contacts and connections.246

rising Nasdaq index and expanding market for ICT on the other; and d) the successful design and
implementation of the Yozma program”).
238
Id. at 15 n.9.
239
Methodological Lessons, supra note 142, at 14.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
See Yozma Program, supra note 237, at 6-7.
246
Id.
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D. The Successful Yozma Design
The results of the Yozma initiative exceeded expectations and are
noteworthy. Yozma I was created in 1993 and in the following three years
established ten drop-down funds.247 The initial Israeli government owned
Yozma I venture capital fund was established a $100M investment, as
follows: $80M of the investment was directed at the ten drop-down funds,
whereas the remaining $20M was to be invested directly in Israeli high-tech
companies.248 The ten initial Yozma I funds, which were created between
the years 1992 to 1997, raised just over $200 Million with the funding
support of the Israeli government.249
The following is a description of the structure of the ten drop-down
Yozma funds. One of the requirements for the establishment of the Yozma
funds was that each of the resulting funds would have to assign at least two
limited partners, one from an established Israeli financial institution and the
other from an established foreign institution. It should be noted that the new
entity, the venture capital fund, had to be an autonomous new organization,
which was not owned by any of the existing financial institutions.250
The “upside” incentive that Yozma provided to private investors was
that they could leverage their profits through acquisition of government
shares, because each of the ten Yozma funds had a call option on
Government shares, at cost (plus interest), for a period of five years.251 The
Yozma I fund and ten drop-down funds were autonomous and independent
Israeli venture capital limited partnerships.252 They also had an emphasis on
early-stage investment in Israeli high-technology companies. Each of the
ten Yozma Israeli venture capital funds was managed by a local Israeli
247

See YOZMA GROUP, supra note 205 (According to Yozma’s web-site, “[w]ith the backing of
prominent American, European and Israeli investors, Yozma successfully launched its second fund,
Yozma II, which commenced operations in September 1998 and its third fund, Yozma III in 2002.
Yozma II & III continued the successful strategy of making direct investments in technology companies
and to play a significant role as a value added investor by recruiting senior managers, formulating
business strategies, raising additional capital rounds and attracting strategic and financial investors to its
portfolio companies”).
248
See Yozma Program, supra note 237, at 7 (“The basic thrust was to promote the establishment
of domestic LP VC funds that invested in very young Israeli high tech startups with the support of
government and with the involvement of reputable foreign VC investors”).
249
See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211.
250
See Yozma Program, supra note 237, at 7 (“[T]“his was made to assure a competitive industry,
which is not lacked-in to the old financial system’s routine). When a fund fulfilled these conditions, the
Government would invest (through Yozma) 40% (up to 8M$) of the funds raised. Thus the $100M of
Government funds would draw at least $150M of private sector funds (domestic and foreign)”).
251
See id. “The incentives to the ‘upside’ also stimulated entry of professional VC firms and
managers (when you have higher returns the government incentive becomes more significant). The
program also assured the realization of learning through the compulsory participation of foreign financial
institutions (most of them were well-experienced foreign VC companies”
252
Id. at 8.
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management team, which partners with an established Israeli financial
institution and a reputable foreign venture capitalist.253
The ten original Yozma funds were managing Israeli funds totaling $2.9
billion. One decade following their inception, the Israeli venture market has
also expanded to sixty additional funds, which were managing
approximately $10 billion.254 According to Dan Senor and Saul Singer, the
“magnitude of this success shows that the ratio of VC investment to GDP is
far higher in Israel than elsewhere.”255
Another feature that set the Yozma initiative apart from other Israeli
government programs at that time was that it eliminated many of the
bureaucratic hurdles. It was all about simplicity, employing a user-friendly
governmental application system and a simple reporting mechanism. There
were no cumbersome application processes or complex reporting
requirements.256
Moreover, Yozma not only “imitated” the Silicon Valley success story,
it also adopted US venture capital friendly legal structures that would attract
foreign investors, which was key to its success.257 There are examples of
foreign government programs, such as in Malaysia, which were designed to
253

Id.
See YOZMA GROUP, supra note 205 (Yozma also “helped a significant number of its portfolio
companies go public on major stock exchanges in the US and Europe. In addition, the group was
instrumental in placing its portfolio companies for an investment or acquisition by leading corporations
such as America On Line, Cisco, Computer Associates, ECI Telecom, General Instruments, Johnson &
Johnson, Medtronic, Microsoft, Sequoia Capital and Benchmark”).
255
BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 157.
256
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 183; see also Yozma Program, supra
note 237, at 5, 8 (Avnimelech is comparing between Yozma and Inbal, and describing the bureaucracy
that Inbal fund managers had to deal with).
257
See Ber, supra note 200, at 15:
The structure of the funds’ activity in Israel is almost identical with that in the US. The Israeli
funds were set up for a limited period of seven years (as compared with ten years in the US), at
the end of which they are liquidated (although the management funds may continue
functioning). During this period they invest in firms in order to bring them to a stage where
they can realize their investment (henceforth, exit). In other words, the activity of the funds—
from the time the firms are selected and throughout the stage of investment in them—is
undertaken for one purpose. Because the lifetime of each fund is limited, the management fund
tends to open a new one every three years. The funds are set up as limited partnerships so that
the capitalists (limited partners) are not involved in the current activity of the fund, and just
receive periodic statements. The payment to the managers of the VC funds is usually divided
into two: current annual payment as a percentage of the fund’s capital (which in Israel is 2–2.5
percent), and a percentage of the yield on successful investments (20–25 percent), which is
usually received only after the initial capital has been repaid to the capitalists (i.e., not at the
first exit).
254
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encourage entrepreneurship but failed258 because they tried to simply
“import” a design from another country without changing the legal or tax
structures, ultimately wasting taxpayers’ money. Some of the Yozma fund’s
legal features included: (1) a fixed life of ten (or seven) years, (2) a limited
partnership, modeled after Delaware partnership law, which was the
standard practice in the United States, and (3) a flow through tax status.259
The payment to the venture capital funds managers were also modeled after
the Silicon Valley “2 and 20” rule, and were typically divided as follows:
annual payment as a percentage of the fund’s capital (2–2.5 %), and a
percentage of the yield on successful investments (20–25 %), which is
obtained only after the initial capital was repaid to the investors
(capitalists).260 Had the government not adopted these new legislation
features and the Israeli treasury department resisted them, it is unlikely that
the program would have become successful.261
E. Yozma vs. Silicon Valley
The emergence of the Israeli high-tech industry in the 1990s is very
similar to that of Silicon Valley.262 Both Israel and Silicon Valley emerged
from multi-faceted collaborations between academic and research
institutions, private local firms and public intervention (such as grants and
continued military spending in technology). However, according to
Avnimelech and Teubal, Silicon Valley didn’t have a background
“backbone” program that parallels the Israeli government’s implementation
of its horizontal R&D grants scheme.263 There are US government programs
that support R&D and small entrepreneurial firms, such as the SBIR,264
which was discussed above and was a federal government initiative that
changed the United States innovation system during the 1980s. SBIR, for
example, was not a targeted policy, such as Yozma, because it was not
258
See BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at 111 (“The frequent failures among
public programs to stimulate entrepreneurship and venture capital suggest that many pitfalls face these
efforts. The stark truth is that many more initiatives have been unsuccessful than successful”).
259
See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211, at 157.
260
See Ber, supra note 200, at 15.
261
See SENOR & SINGER, supra note 211, at 166-170.
262
Gil Avnimelech & Morris Teubal, Venture Capital Policy in Israel: A Comparative Analysis &
Lessons for Other Countries 1-55 (Presented at the International Conference: Financial Systems,
Corporate Investment in Innovation and Venture Capital, Brussels, 2002) [hereinafter Comparative
Analysis].
263
Id.
264
Id. at 37; see also Venture Capitalist, supra note 144, at 285-86 (SBIR “has provided over $7
billion to small high-technology firms between 1983 and 1997 [and] awardees enjoyed substantially
greater employment and sales growth than the matching firms”).
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designed to create a venture capital industry.265
Avnimelech and Teubal compared Yozma to other international
(including US) government programs that supported the venture capital
industry, such as programs that provide supply and risk sharing incentives
to investors.266 There are several unique features of Yozma. First, its main
incentive - the “upside” – if the future venture capital funds became
profitable, then the private investors had a “call option” on the Israeli
government’s shares. The call option was for a period of five years, at cost,
plus a five to seven percent interest.267 Second, Yozma guaranteed a
“learning from others” process (or a realization of “supply side learning,”)
because it mandated the participation of a foreign financial institution.268
Third, the Yozma funds were structured to allow informal interaction
amongst the different managers of the funds.269 Fourth, there was active
participation of the government, the Office of the Chief Scientist) (The
Chief Scientist was the founder of Yozma - Yigal Erlich), and the other OCS
officers at the board meetings of all the Yozma funds.270 Fifth, there was an
aggressive investment policy and steady stimulation of co-investment
between the Yozma Funds.271 Sixth, on the “demand side,” the support for
the industry was provided by other Israeli government “backbone” R&D
support programs as well as by the Technological Incubators Programs,272
discussed below.
V. CAN THE NEW INITIATIVE FOR THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERVENTION IN
THE MARKET IN THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OWNED ENTERPRISES
PREVENT ABUSE?
There are many who oppose the idea of an interventionalist government.
Moreover, there are several arguments that criticize government owned
enterprises, like the ones suggested in this Article (i.e., the Matchmaker),
265
See Comparative Analysis, supra note 262, at 6 (noting there were other general policies that had
an effect on venture capital formation in the US, such as the reduction in capital gains tax, but they are
not targeted policies).
266
Id. at 19. Yozma “did not provide guarantees nor tax benefits; nor was it accompanied by new
regulation rules for Pension Funds.” Id.; see also id. at 20 n.20 (“Capital Gains tax was relatively low at
the time and Pension Funds were allowed to invest a small amount on VC subject to Government
regulation. In both respects Israel's situation was ‘level playing field’ with that of other countries at the
time”).
267
Id. at 20.
268
See Comparative Analysis, supra note 262, at 20.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
See id.
272
Id.
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due to their inefficiency and even wastefulness. The following are some of
these arguments.

A. The problem of Inadequate Monitoring of Public
Management
There are several theories that deal with the problem of inadequate
monitoring of public managers, in this case, the managers of the
Matchmaker model. Agency theory deals with the shirking behavior of
agents.273 The government as a stakeholder in the Coalition model must deal
with the uncertainty surrounding the actual innovation development, 274 on
top of the potential opportunistic conducts of the managers.275
Managers of the Matchmaker must deal with information risks – the
“adverse selection” challenge276 – prior to any engagement with or
investment in a startup or idea. The managers will be in charge of acquiring
information about the potential portfolio companies, ideas, technology and
processes. They will also be required to select the appropriate venture or
idea based on the information provided and make sure that the venture is
not investing in “lemons.”
Property rights theory also discusses the problem of inadequate
monitoring of managers. In the model, the monitoring issue can arise as a
result of the government ownership stake, and the fact that the government’s
stake is not traded in the open market. Therefore, it excludes the
transferability of the ownership.277
Finally, public managers have to deal with challenges of complying with
formal decision-making procedures and bureaucracy that are associated
with getting government funding or grants.278
Answer
First, according to Michael Jensen and William Meckling, agency
problem is a common problem and exists in all enterprises and cooperation
273

See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ. 74, 75 (1979).
See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
275
See also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148, at 127-31; see also Utset, supra note 148, at 54274

55.
276
Akerlof, supra note 148, at 493; see also Utset, supra note 148, at 56 n.21; see also GOMPERS &
LERNER, supra note 148, at 129.
277
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General Knowledge and
Organizational Structure, in MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY 103
(Harvard Univ. Press 1998).
278
See Fillipo Belloc, Innovation in State-Owned Enterprises: Reconsidering Conventional
Wisdom, 48 J. ECON. ISSUES 821, 827 (2014).

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5

2018]

THE COALITION MODEL

319

forms.279 Therefore, it is not a unique characteristic of a public or quasipublic enterprise.
The analysis of the Agency theory assumes that the main problem is to
align the interests of the principal and agent, and to get the agent to follow
the principal’s orders, without taking into account the agent’s interests.
Perhaps it would be wise to also take into account the agent and its interests,
in order to make sure that the principal will keep its end of the bargain. The
initiative addresses this concern, as discussed in this article below.
Second, it is possible that the fact that the shares of the Matchmaker are
not easily transferrable, can cause poor monitoring of the management
because it provides ownership stability and hence not enough incentives for
management to work hard and maximize profit.280 However, it is also
possible that ownership instability can weaken and decrease managements’
incentive to innovate.281
There is empirical evidence that suggests that active markets actually
have a negative effect on innovative investment strategies, as follows. While
a firm is not listed on the market, management is in reality more inclined to
invest in innovating research because it has more tolerance towards
failures,282 mainly because outside investors cannot observe (or closely)
monitor the rate of project advancements.283 Managers may abstain from
investing in risky innovation if they are under a constant threat of loosing
279
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976)
The problem of inducing an “agent” to behave as if he were maximizing the “principal’s”
welfare is quite general. It exists in all organizations and in all cooperative efforts— at every
level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in
governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as
agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate.
The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these
situations (where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and why they are born
will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social
sciences generally.
280
See Belloc, supra note 278, at 828.
281
See id.
282
See Daniel Ferreira et al., Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to Go Public or Private, REV.
OF FIN. STUD., Jan. 2014, at 256, 256 (“We show that it is optimal to go public when exploiting existing
ideas and optimal to go private when exploring new ideas. This result derives from the fact that private
firms are less transparent to outside investors than are public firms. In private firms, insiders can time
the market by choosing an early exit strategy if they receive bad news. This option makes insiders more
tolerant of failures and thus more inclined to invest in innovative projects. In contrast, the prices of
publicly traded securities react quickly to good news, providing insiders with incentives to choose
conventional projects and cash in early”); see also Belloc, supra note 278, at 827 (“By contrast, publicly
traded securities require disclosure of all the relevant information and their market prices quickly react
to business successes and failures, thereby encouraging insiders to choose conventional projects”).
283
See Ferreira et al., supra note 282, at 266; see also Belloc, supra note 278, at 827.
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their jobs and of a change in both ownership and management.284
As noted in this article, the information asymmetry problems are even
more complex in the Matchmaker examples, as compared to other public
enterprise initiatives, due to the fact that the managerial decision-making in
high-technology requires more knowledge than the general managerial
skills.285 The startup manager is required to apply, verify and understand the
technical information necessary for the managerial decision-making
process.286 That is one of the reasons why this article strongly suggests that
the managers appointed will have the requisite professional private sector
experience, know-how and involvement. It should be noted that
professional venture capital funds also face and are able to overcome the
same information asymmetry issues.287
Moreover, security markets are often inefficient. 288 In the event that
public managers’ performance is measured by the securities market,
managers might increase their emphasis on short-term profits, which will,
in turn, sacrifice long-term innovative investment strategies because they
would like to avoid being replaced.289
Third, government owned firms can (and are advised to) reduce the
amount of bureaucratic decision- making processes. See the examples of InQ-Tel case study above.

284
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33-56 (A. Auerbach ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1998).
285
See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 277, at 12 (Jensen and Meckling established that agency
problems due to conflicts between investors and managers can have an effect on the interest of both
equity and debt holders to supply capital and invest (“[i]t is generally impossible for the principal or the
agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.
In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs
(non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s
decisions and those decisions, which would maximize the welfare of the principal”)). For further
discussion on agency problems and strategies to reduce them, see also John Armour, Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW:
A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reinier H. Kraakman et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d
ed. 2009).
286
See also Utset, supra note 148, at 57; see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 148, at 127-31
(discussing the information asymmetry issue and other risks that venture capitalists face while dealing
with start-ups).
287
According to a report by U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, only ten percent of VCs manage to get a
return on their investment. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 149, at 19.
288
See Lynn Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure and
Securities Regulations, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 650 (1995).
289
Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 62 (1988).
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B. Lack of Market Discipline of Government-Owned Firms
There is a long debate in economic literature on the relationship between
innovation production and market competition.290 The argument against
implementation of this initiative is that there is no market discipline on
government owned firms because of the “soft budget constraint
problem.”291 As a result of the soft budget constraint problem, managers of
the proposed Matchmaker initiative will not be concerned with the portfolio
firm’s financial conditions and will subsequently undertake reckless
strategies.292

Answer
As for the issue of the unrestricted budget, a hard budget constraint can
be imposed in practice.293 Furthermore, Fillipo Belloc notes that in order to
encourage innovation, there is a need to center on long-term investment and
strategy. Therefore “an excessive short-term attention to cash flows” might
actually discourage innovation.294 Moreover, according to Phillipe Aghion
et al., the incentives of management to innovate might in reality increase if
they are “insulated” from penalties for failure of the portfolio innovative
290
Phillipe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship, 120
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 701, 701 (2005); see also Belloc, supra note 278, at 829.
291
See J. Kornai, Resource-Constrained Versus Demand-Constrained Systems, 47 ECONOMETRICA
801, 806 (1979) (The budget constraint of a firm is soft if the government helps the firm out of trouble
- i.e. the government covers firm’s losses - through subsidies, tax exemption, credit granted at soft
conditions, etc.); see also Belloc, supra note 278, at 829.
292
See id.; see also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q. J. ECON.
995, 997 (1994) (analyzing political influence on firms); see also MARY SHIRELY & AHMED GALAL,
BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP, WORLD
BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT 10 (1995) (“[M]any governments did not reward managers who
attained contract targets; where bonuses or other rewards were offered, soft targets frequently
undermined their impact … politicians carefully weigh any change in state enterprise policies, preferring
those that benefit their constituents and help them remain in power”) (This argument has been largely
used to support privatization initiatives as a commitment device of the government to harden the budget
constraint of firms); see Klaus M. Schmidt, The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete
Contracts Approach, 12 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 1 (1996). Schmidt argues that “different allocations of
ownership rights lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm, which in turn affect
both allocative and productive efficiency. Privatization is seen as a commitment device of the
government to credibly threaten to cut back subsidies if costs are high in order to give managers better
cost-saving incentives (a ‘harder budget constraint’). The cost of privatization is that allocative
efficiency is distorted.”
293
See Belloc, supra note 278, at 830 (“[T]o the best of my knowledge, the causal relationship
between soft budget constraints and the output of innovation has not been investigated”); see also
Kornai, supra note 291, at 807.
294
See Belloc, supra note 278, at 834-35.
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projects.295
C. Illegal Behavior and Corruption of Public Managers
Public managers’ actions can have serious effects on economic
activity.296 There are many examples of public manager’s misbehavior, such
as rent-seeking, corruption or other illegal activities, that can not only
hamper the manager’s decision-making process, but may also reduce the
incentives and opportunities to invest in innovation.297 It should be noted
that the illegal behavior might also result from various conflicts of interest
of public managers.298
Answer
It is true that managers in general, whether public or private, can behave
illegally for various reasons. Additionally, public managers can also be
involved in situations of conflict of interest, “but it is difficult to say a priori
whether this happens to a greater (or lower) extent than for private
managers,” according to Belloc.299 Managers of private firms also have their
fair share of conflicts of interest with other stakeholders, for example, due
to their investment in securities or derivatives of other firms.300
In the Coalition Model, the managers are dealing with industrial sectors
295

Phillipe Aghion et al., Innovation and Institutional Ownership, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 278

(2013).
296

See Belloc, supra note 278, at 830.
There are many examples of causes to possible corruption of public managers, such as ones
resulting from pressures of interest groups, lobbies, or even individual persons influence. See id.; see
also, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 599, 599 (1993) (Shleifer and
Vishny introduce “two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and
of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak
governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the
illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its
sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is
so high and so costly to development”).
298
See Belloc, supra note 278, at 831.
299
Id.
300
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1256 (2008) (“[G]reater shareholder power should be coupled with greater shareholder
responsibility… the rules of fiduciary duty traditionally applied to officers and directors and, more
rarely, to controlling shareholders, should be applied to activist minority investors as well”); see also
Belloc, supra note 278, at 831 (There are many forms of self-dealing by corporate insiders in private
corporations, including appropriation of corporate opportunities, excessive compensation, self-serving
financial transactions and outright theft of corporate assets); see also Simeon Djankov et al., The Law
and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 430 (2008) (“[T]hose who control a corporation,
whether they are managers, controlling shareholders, or both, can use their power to divert corporate
wealth to themselves, without sharing it with the other investors. Various forms of such self- dealing
include executive perquisites to excessive compensation, transfer pricing, taking of corporate
opportunities, self-serving financial transactions such as directed equity issuance or personal loans to
insiders, and outright theft of corporate assets”) (internal citations omitted).
297

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol17/iss2/5

2018]

THE COALITION MODEL

323

and hence with business objectives that are similar to those of private
managers in the market. Therefore, their behavior can be analogous to their
private manager counterparts.301
D. Political Capture of Business Objectives
The main argument for the privatization of government owned firms has
been the political capture of business purposes and objectives.302 There are
several examples of politicians who control government (particularly state)
owned firms. Politicians, who would like to make their constituencies
happy, are concerned with job creation. Therefore, they have a tendency
to push for more recruitment than necessary in order to create jobs and spend
more (in excess) than the private market would on an initiative.303
Moreover, politicians can also push for initiatives, projects and corporations
that will essentially be tools to transfer wealth to their supporters, partners
or relatives.304 These examples can seriously hamper the innovation process
and diminish the productive process.305 Moreover, governments can elect to
pay higher wages to government workers (higher than are customary in the
301
See Belloc, supra note 278, at 832; see Christopher Hood, A Public Management for All Seasons,
69 PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3 (1991) (discussing the group of ideas known as ‘new public management’ (NPM),
as well as their criticism) (NMP is a movement that encourages public administrations and non-profit
firms to implement pay-for-performance programs); see also Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz, Can
Private Learn from Public Governance?, 115 ECON. J. 377, 377 (2005) (According to Frey and Benz,
“in view of recent corporate scandals, private governance can learn from public governance: (1) Goaloriented intrinsic motivation of agents should be supported by fixed incomes and an extensive selection
process of employees; (2) Extrinsic, but non-monetary incentives (e.g. conferring orders and titles) can
be used; (3) The power of actors should be restricted by a clear division of power, appropriate rules of
succession and institutionalised competition for positions in firms.” Frey and Benz further criticize the
current private sector management compensation that “has often increased still more, even though share
prices have plummeted. This suggests that, in actual fact, the compensation of managers has little to do
with performance. Rather, the reason for the steady increase in compensation is now widely seen in the
fact that managers are able to exert considerable control over how much money they get. Some managers
even resorted to unlawfully misrepresenting their firms accounts in order to raise their private incomes.
A particularly troubling aspect is that, in many instances, extended pay-for-performance plans have
created the very incentives to commit fraud, by making it attractive to produce short-term increases in
share prices”) (internal citations omitted). Id. at 378.
302
See Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1998, at 133,142,
148 (arguing the “importance of ownership as the source of capitalist incentives to innovate”; and that
“state firms are inefficient not just because their managers have weak incentives to reduce costs, but
because inefficiency is the result of the government's deliberate policy to transfer resources to
supporters”).
303
See Belloc, supra note 278, at 832.
304
See id.
305
See Shleifer, supra note 302, at 141 (arguing that “[g]overnments throughout the world have
long directed benefits to their political supporters, whether in the form of jobs at above-market wages or
outright transfers”).
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private market), which will surpass the productivity levels.306
Answer
It is true that one of the main concerns of any government led initiative
is the fear of political abuse. As discussed in the proposed model, in terms
of governance, autonomous Matchmaker VC organizations must be formed,
and the management must be independent in order to set goals, supervise,
and most of all limit the dangers of political pressures and abuse.307
Additionally, according to Belloc, there are actions, such as increasing
wages and employment or settling production plants in depressed areas,
which government can take that do not lessen the social welfare but correct
market failures or internalize negative externalities.308
Moreover, Belloc discusses the fact that the uncertainty of re-election
gives politicians an incentive to behave.309 There are several factors that can
contribute to the citizens’ ability to hold politicians accountable for abuse
of power,310 such as free press,311 political framework,312 and participation
rights.313 Therefore, to prevent a public manager from misbehaving,
appropriate incentives must be put in place, as well as institutional and
economic systems.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
At a time when the American economy continues to try to ramp up and
recover economically, the proposed Coalition Model is intended to pave the
way for policymakers to consider and institute new initiatives that can
encourage innovation, drive growth, create new entrepreneurial firms and
increase the overall productivity, profitability and sustainability of
American businesses.
It is based on the economic growth theory offered by Solow.314 Solow
postulated that technological innovation is the only reliable engine that can
drive change and is the fundamental source of sustained productivity and
growth.
306
Giacomo Corneo & Rafael Rob, Working in Public and Private Firms, 87 J. PUB. ECON. 1335,
1338 (2003).
307
See also BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34.
308
See Belloc, supra note 278, at 832.
309
See id. at 833 (Belloc argues that politicians react to incentives, such as economic and noneconomic, and cultural, like any other individual does).
310
Id.
311
Aymo Brunetti & Beatrice Weder, A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption, 87 J. PUB. ECON.
1801, 1801 (2003).
312
See Belloc, supra note 278, at 833.
313
See id.
314
Solow, supra note 13.
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The Coalition Model builds on Solow’s postulations by adding the
following: first, the government needs to invest in knowledge, human
capital and innovation in order to encourage knowledge spillovers.315
Second, there is a need to encourage the formation and survival of new
entrepreneurial firms, because they are predominantly innovative and
stimulate growth.316 Third, the United States Government has an important
role in developing growth in the market.317 This article calls for the
government to take part in the proposed public-private partnerships and to
take into account strategic planning that can benefit society for future
generations.
Operationally, these concepts are configured through the Coalition
model’s Matchmaker (government investment in start-ups) Initiatives. The
Matchmaker is a private-public equity investment fund that will function to
invest in early stage firms, while also addressing the commercial strategic
development needs articulated by the funding governmental agency. It also
establishes a channel for private firms to access government procurement
and development. This initiative will function as autonomous body, and is
designed to prevent political capture.
This Coalition Model, based on emerging variations in Israel and Silicon
Valley, is proving to be successful in addressing economic growth and
sustainability in America.
This article also joins the call for a return to a basic “managerialism”
philosophy.318 Managers of public corporations nowadays cannot
realistically pursue long-term projects, such as R&D, because such projects
cannot generate immediate financial returns to their shareholders.
Therefore, this model calls for management to take into account the interests
of all stakeholders.
While this Model tries to address a number of solutions to grow the
economy and encourage innovation, it has limitations. The one-model fits
all format for the various regions, states, and government agencies can run
into problems given geopolitical realities at the local, state, federal and
international levels which can confound these relations at any given level.
Also, legal scholars will be challenged in the future in terms of rewriting
315

David B. Audretsch, Entrepreneurship: A Survey of the Literature 5 (Enterprise DirectorateGeneral, European Commission, Enterprise Papers No. 14, 2003) (“Entrepreneurship has become the
engine of economic and social development throughout the world. The role of entrepreneurship has
changed dramatically between the traditional and new economies”).
316
BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMS, supra note 34, at ch. 1.
317
See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 25, at 57.
318
See Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1181-82 (2013).
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and reinterpreting intellectual property and antitrust laws, but that is not
within the scope of this Article.
Using the Coalition Model and its variants should, as seen from
encouraging preliminary results, develop into a new high bar standard for
helping to expand strategic and sustained economic growth, innovation and
development for generations to come.
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